A critical analysis of adherence to federalist principles in three of Africa's largest democracies.
By Ryan Cauwenberghs
Introduction
In 2017, Cameroon’s western provinces bore witness to the resurgence of an age-old demon with the eruption of the "Anglophone crisis," diverse factions rallying under the banner of Ambazonia to call for complete separation from the Cameroonian state. The region has since been plagued by conflict, displacing hundreds of thousands of civilians and resulting in thousands of casualties. Seeking to address the turmoil, in 2019, President Biya convened a national dialogue. Much to the government’s surprise, discussions amongst both adversaries and partisans centred less on short term solutions and more on underlying causes, a topic not originally on the agenda. For many, the root cause of the crisis was easily discernible, namely Cameroon’s 1972 shift from a federal to a unitary state [1]. The opponent Canbral Libii asserts, "To resolve this crisis, it is crucial to change the structure of the State towards a federalism that acknowledges ethnic, community, and linguistic diversity. Special attention must be given to the language issue, considering the communities that overlap between English-speaking and French-speaking regions... Federalism is a doctrine aimed at uniting diverse entities within a common space." Although the current crisis in Cameroon is notably severe, it is not without precedent in the region. A comprehensive exploration of potential pathways to resolution hence prompts the broader question: what might federalism have to offer sub-Saharan Africa?
Federalism originates neither in hellenic philosophy nor in renaissance thought, but rather, as demonstrated by Daniel J. Elazar, in the Judeo-Christian tradition, as translated by the notion of a covenant [2]. The peaceful coexistence of diverse groups prevails in the presence of a pact between individuals and groups, underpinning what Elazar will come to define as the federal principle, revolving broadly around the concepts of constitutionally mandated local autonomy, an areal division of power, and mutual interdependence within the framework of a democratic society [3]. This idea, conceptually tied to Aristotle's notion of "philia," crucial to the survival of small democratic city-states [4], will be given a modern political interpretation by Johannes Althusius’ analyses of 17th century German states [5]. In opposition to the classical conception of the singular centre, within which the authority of the state is concentrated and from which it flows, Elazar’s federal matrix model stipulates that a federal-democratic system, ought to take root in a simultaneously non-centric and polycentric distribution of prerogatives, described as "the structured dispersion of powers among many centres whose legitimate authority is constitutionally guaranteed."
Early notions of federalism, much like those of decentralisation, are grounded in the principle of subsidiarity, an integral element of Catholic social teaching, whereby decisions are to be made at the level closest to those concerned [6]. However, as Ferran Requejo demonstrates, the application of federal principles is paradoxically more antonymous than synonymous with the politically fashionable decentralisation, necessitating the primacy of a central core from which powers are transferred to subordinate entities [7]. Within a federal regime, power is not transferred, but partitioned polycentrically. This vital distinction resonates within Elazar's delimitation, emphasising that the authority of constituent entities does not emanate from the federal state and therefore cannot be reclaimed through a process of centralisation, hence the image of a matrix. The adherence to federal principles necessitates their incorporation into the constitution of the federation, delineating the respective jurisdictions of the federated (composing) entities and the federal (composed) body [8]. Federated bodies thus enjoy inviolable autonomy within the established constitutional framework, participating simultaneously in decision-making at the federal level and governance at the local level.
Federalism is not an end in and of itself but rather a means to attain the fullness of democratic organisation. René Capitant, drawing on a reinterpretation of Rousseau’s principle of unanimity, asserts that true democracy is only viable within the framework of a federal system, "recognising within itself the existence of a plurality of autonomous groups" [9]. Elazar nuances this affirmation, conceding that the Jacobin model, itself born of Rousseau's concept of popular will (majoritarianism), permits republican political organisation, without however conflating the moral equality of the two approaches: "federalists also differ from other democrats in that, although they see substantial equality as a necessary precondition for the establishment and maintenance of liberty, they also see liberty as taking precedence over the striving for absolute equality. Hence they are willing to sacrifice a certain amount of equality for the sake of liberty as distinct from those who would sacrifice liberty on behalf of equality."
In sub-Saharan Africa, this dynamic bears particular relevance in the case of constitutional mimicry, the approximate reproduction of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic (1958), a replicative tendency begetting the transposition onto former French colonies of conflictual dynamics between Jacobins (centralisers) and Girondins (decentralisers) and effectively precluding federalism altogether [10]. We therefore cannot speak of a true federalist project in any state born of French colonisation, with the noted exception of Cameroon, whilst examples of separatism abound. For quite some time, the prevailing context has led to a misguided view regarding the potential application of federalism to purportedly "imported" or “artificial” states [11]. This qualifier represents both a temporal and semantic error: in Europe, discussions historically revolve around linguistic groups (Catalan, Flemish, Corsican), whereas in Africa, the term tribe (Igbo, Fang, Diola) is employed to describe an identical ethno-regional dynamic. One might thus contend that the obstacles to state formation and democratic consolidation are neither inherent nor insurmountable. Are the purportedly artificial African states, whose right to existence was affirmed by the Treaty of the Organisation of African Unity (1963), somehow less legitimate than Belgium, whose territorial formation was similarly determined by Great Britain just a few decades earlier? Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch's work succinctly summarises the weakness of this argument, affirming that no border is natural, but rather reflects a purely human objective of coexistence; its legitimacy is thus constructed, often through bloodshed and patience [12]. In sub-Saharan Africa, the concept of the border remains paramount, centrifugal separatism constituting a principal barrier to democratic consolidation; federalism may thus represent a manner to accommodate differences within a democratic structure. At its core, the federal principle is merely the political recognition of pluralism. In the case of sub-Saharan Africa, whose incomparable diversity necessitates certain generalisations, the pluralism confronting a purportedly democratic state remains rooted in pre-colonial political formations embodied by ethno-linguistic groups, a multiplicity of demoi. In Elazar's conception, these groups, confined to more or less constant territorial areas, lend themselves to the establishment of an areal division, enabling "the accommodation of very diverse groups whose differences are fundamental rather than transient within the same polity by giving them territorial power bases of their own has enhanced the ability of federal systems to function as vehicles of political integration while preserving democratic government" (Elazar 1987). On this basis, we might pose ourselves the following question. Must African states adhere to centralist, homogenising structural paradigms, the grim outcomes of which are hard to overlook, or might the hour have arrived to explore alternative theoretical underpinnings for democratic state formation ?
We return thus to Elazar’s concept of the federal revolution, whose three conditions, namely “the emergence of the modern nation-state... the breakdown of the premodern community with its organic lines of authority based on essentially fixed social relationships... the breakdown of the old aristocratic principles in favour of a new commitment to equality, with its concomitant demand for the creation of a more democratic social and political order,” have long been present in sub-Saharan Africa, restrained however by poorly adapted constitutional structures. In the case of sub-Saharan Africa, the federal model that initially asserts itself is characterised as scissiparous (multiplication through division, whilst maintaining the integrity of the whole), what Requejo refers to as the model of "regional states" or what Martin Kasongo more precisely describes as "federalism through dissociation," conceived in opposition to German or American models which emphasise expansive aggregation around common interests and values. Alfred Stepan makes an astute distinction between "holding together," focused on maintaining unity within a diverse framework, whereas "bringing together" emphasises actively unifying disparate elements into a cohesive whole. In the wake of national conferences that swept through Francophone Africa in the early 1990s, aimed at ending the single-party system and solidified by the famous Conférence de la Baule (1991), another Africa witnessed a federalist revolution [13]. Whilst outcomes remain mixed, this movement outlined the contours of a genuine African federalism, simultaneously highlighting associated challenges.
This discussion will thus examine three attempts at federal democracy, the cases of Ethiopia (1995), South Africa (1996), and Nigeria (1999), aiming to uncover fundamental principles and major obstacles nearly three decades later. Shall be highlighted, on one hand, the federal constitutions adopted by the respective states, and on the other hand, the implementation of federal principles, or lack thereof, to draw conclusions regarding the federalist resurgence of the 1990s.
The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (1995)
The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, home to some 120 million inhabitants, and whose current borders trace roughly the imperial conquest of Menelik II (1889-1913), constitutes the modern incarnation of a centuries-old political formation. The defeat of the relatively decentralised neo-Solomonic Ethiopian empire to fascist Italy precipitated, over the course of Haile Selassie's reign (1930-1936, 1941-1974), a nation-building endeavour predominantly centred on the Amhara ethnicity. Although professing Marxist-Leninist principles, the Derg, a military junta that ruled from 1974 to 1991, only intensified centralist tendencies of the former regime, placing itself squarely in the crosshairs of ethno-regional parties such as the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF), and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) [14]. The eventual fall of the regime, in 1991, was thus a clarion call signalling the need for structural change in this foyer of tensions, opposing centrifugal and centripetal forces.
As noted, federal principles have historically allowed certain states, by scissiparous dissociation, to accommodate subnational particularities, often ethnolinguistic, susceptible to undermine national harmony (e.g., Belgium, Canada). It is in this framework that Ethiopia, with a critical interpretation of its own history, formally adopted a federalist constitution in 1995, unique in recognising ethnicity as the determining factor of federated units, thus giving rise to what might be termed ethno-federalism. The document aims not to constitute not a single nation (demos) but rather a union of diverse nations (demoi) united by a "common destiny," described by J. C. Paul as a "treaty among nations and peoples," the most notable objective of which would be lasting peace [15].
Critics have vehemently contested the conceptual validity of ethnic federalism, purportedly contributing to the fragmentation of multiethnic federations by empowering regional formations often inclined towards independence and solidifying ethnic identities [16]. As remarked by Tarlton (1965), the composition of a federation along identitarian cleavages ought to be seen as a measure of last resort for a state otherwise condemned to dissolution [17]. One might contend on this basis that the principle of identitarian federalism is neither fundamentally flawed nor unworkable, but poorly instituted in the case of Ethiopia.
As established, the guiding principle of the Ethiopian constitution is ethnicity; according to Adriano Dirri's analysis, the preamble's first line underscores the purity of the ethno-regional model within the document, replacing the traditional "We, the people" with "We, the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (NNP) of Ethiopia", outlining in following lines the parameters of a "political community" intended in part to address historical injustices [18]. Concrete provisions grant extensive cultural autonomy to the diverse regions, of which the constitution recognized 9 (increased to 10 in 2019, 11 in 2021, 12 in 2023), article 5 notably attributing to each region the right to establish its own linguistic policies, a question historically at the centre of tensions in the context of Amhara domination. The constituent regions of the federation, defined by the majority ethnicity, enjoy unprecedented constitutional autonomy on the continent, including the right to secession under Article 39.1, intended to assure the voluntary character of a unified Ethiopia. The birth of ethno-federalism hence demonstrates a conscious reflection upon Ethiopia’s history and proposes a functioning, albeit imperfect, framework to hold together an otherwise untenable situation.
Certain scholars, such as John Cohen, contest that the very principle of Article 39, permitting autodetermination up to the point of secession, undermines the indivisibility of the state, contradicting the federalist ideal of a “more perfect union” [19]. Ought any self-defined group have the right to defigure the state at any moment ? In most ideal federations the right to secession has been explicitly rejected as a state competency, as notably demonstrated by the US Supreme Court in Texas v. White (1869) [20]. One might suspect that, put to the test, as it was by the growth of the Tigray Independence Party in 2021, this principle of convenience is difficult to respect. If the essence of federal thinking is the pact, and the essence of democracy is the compromise, secession is inherently incompatible with either. The structure of Ethiopia’s governing institutions was however never intended to facilitate the application of such a right.
At the regional level, the cultural autonomy accorded to Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (NNP) is undermined by a practical lack of control in equally consequential domaines, resulting from a party-led centralisation of the state. As noted by Bizuneh Yimenu, “because party and state are fused, and regional parties are inferior to the national party, self-determination right is also subordinated to the wishes of the hegemonic party-state. This has generated a vast gulf between the constitution and the practice of self-rule and accommodation.” The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), initiator of the 1995 constitution and the foundation of the political structure since then, prior to its fragmentation in 2019, consisted of four major allied ethno-regional parties (Amhara, Oromia, SNNP, and Tigray), drafting the constitution with the awareness of the potential to act as a perpetual coalition within the legislative organs [21]. In short, the creation of a federal system was never accompanied by a genuine intent to manifest it. Consequently, beyond cultural competencies, autonomy is constrained by a constitution that allows the federal government to devise and execute the nation's comprehensive socio-economic and development policies, plans, and strategies.
If this federal model has permitted Ethiopia to accommodate divergent cultural interests, it has not however lent itself to democratic consolidation. The primacy of the group at the expense of the individual, a violation of Elazar’s federal principles, will lead to what Dr. Berihun Adunga Gebeye describes as an ethnocracy rather than democracy, running up against a certain number of practical inconsistencies, primarily stemming from the gap between the theoretical conception of an Ethiopia clearly divisible into ethno-regions and the somewhat more complex reality on the ground [22]. For instance, we find that the Southern Nations, Nationalities and People Region (SNNPR) encompassed, before its division in 2023, over 45 defined groups. No specific criteria delimit the qualifications for an NNP, nor is justification provided for the attribution of a region to certain groups, whilst others find themselves obligated to share the territory. The constitution merely affirms that such entities, the true federated units of the organisation, are endowed with a large range of identity-based autonomies.
More concretely, the bicameral legislative body, a fundamental of federalist practice, betrays the very notion in refusing to accord the House of Federation (Upper Chamber) any significant legislative capacity, delegating the quasi-totality of such prerogatives to the The House of Peoples’ Representatives (Lower Chamber) [23]. The supposed non-centralisation in favour of distinct groups appears to lose its revolutionary power, to the degree that such groups are denied legislative jurisdiction within the central apparatus, the HPR being elected by direct suffrage, favouring thus the most populous NNP. Article 61 undoubtedly grants a unique position to the NNP through the House of the Federation (Upper Chamber), composed of at least one member from each NNP plus an additional member for every million of its population, emphasising a judicial rather than legislative role charged with interpreting the constitution and assuring equitable relations between the peoples represented. It is important to emphasise that it is not the region that is represented but the NNP; thus, the SNNPR region, which constituted 21.08% of the Ethiopian population in 2015, divided into 55 NNPs, was allocated 43% of the seats, whereas Oromia, which is monoethnic and constitutes 38.87% of the population, occupied only 20.26%. If this arrangement is not a major source of contention, it is due to a deprivation in terms of political power allocated to the institution. The concentration of legislative authority within the lower house, historically dominated by the EPRDF, renders the state much closer to a single party ethnocracy than a functioning federal democracy.
Through Elazar's lens, Ethiopian federal democracy, born at a tipping point, appears more like a cynical attempt by dominant groups to hold together a political entity on the brink of fragmentation than a true embodiment of federalist principles, let alone democracy. Aware of the finite nature of cultural domination patterns, certain political entities appear to have acquiesced to the transfer of cultural competencies and the instrumentalisation of ethnicity to maintain political hegemony over the country. The harrowing Tigray war thus underscores the effects of excluding a previously dominant party from the governing coalition, betraying the promises of autonomy and unity between regions.
The Republic of South Africa (1996)
South Africa, the continent's second largest economic power and home to approximately 58 million inhabitants, has over time become quasi-synonymous with diversity. While political entities governing its ever-shifting borders have historically entertained federalist notions, from the era of Anglo-Boer rivalry to the apartheid regime, this analysis critically examines the federal system established following the 1994 democratic transition, as enshrined in the 1996 Constitution. The preponderant influence of the African National Congress (ANC) at the dissolution of the apartheid regime appeared to suggest the imminent birth of a unitary state centred around the dominant party. Despite numerous efforts in this direction, the ANC was compelled to accept a quasi-federal arrangement, enshrined in the revolutionary post-apartheid constitution of 1996 in order to temper the aspirations of two local power centres, the Nationalist Party (White/Mixed) of the Western Cape and the Inkatha Freedom Party (Zulu) of KwaZulu-Natal, fearing that these entities might seek to assert separation from the nascent republic [24]. Whilst the text refrains from explicitly employing the term federalism, and its framers vehemently opposed the country's division along ethnic lines, reminiscent of past Bantustans, federal principles, heavily inspired by the German model, nevertheless serve as the guiding ethos. The general consensus (Haysom, Elazar) establishes without much contestation that the South African model is fundamentally federal, founding a republic composed of nine regional entities each with a provincial legislature accountable to its population.
The constitution of 1996 distinguishes itself in emphasising not only the rights of communities but also those of individuals, citing explicitly anti-racism, anti-sexism, dignity, and equality, synthesising thus a liberal republic. As Dirri notes, the preamble, conceived as a response to the apartheid system, broadly outlines the post-racial nature of the state, nurturing the aspiration of a "rainbow nation" or of a people "united in diversity" [25]. In affirming the existence of a nation “firmly committed, in the full and free exercise of our right to self-determination, to build a political community... by rectifying historically unjust relationships... determined to consolidate... a democratic order that our struggles and sacrifices have brought about,” the preamble permits the Constitutional Court to formulate an interpretation of specific provisions outlined in the document, arriving at the overarching principle of national solidarity within the context of significant heterogeneity [26].
South African federalism displays a structurally integrative nature, constituting a prime example of ‘marble-cake federalism’, wherein a significant portion of powers and policy assignments are shared between the three administrative tiers (national, provincial, municipal) on a concurrent list, as mandated by Articles 40 and 41 [27]. Despite its advantages, this arrangement is vulnerable to dominance by a single party, which remains the case in South Africa. The cooperative federalism targeted in the 1996 Constitution, focused on intercommunal solidarity, remains hindered by the centralist tendencies of the ANC. Its uninterrupted and exclusive control over the state apparatus has allowed it to assume numerous competencies intended for joint management. Some, such as Kassongo, contend that whilst the national administration clearly heads the hierarchy, its intervention in provinces remains limited by choice, allowing them quasi-autonomous decision-making powers in areas such as education and health [28]. It would seem however that this is often unnecessary, given the total adherence of seven provinces to the ANC’s doctrine, acting in practice as executioners of its will more so than as legitimate counterpowers. This tendency is perhaps best demonstrated by the renouncement of the seven aforementioned provinces to adopt a provincial constitution differing from the national text. The case of the Western Cape demonstrates that attempts to establish provincial particularity remain largely futile. The Constitutional Court, the members of which are appointed by the President of the Republic, has unsurprisingly shown little inclination to rule in favour of provincial jurisdictions over the central state, reiterating that laws enacted at the provincial level must conform to national law, thereby severely limiting opportunities for any particularist deviation. Steytler and Mettler demonstrate that even in the case of the Western Cape, the only province to adopt its own constitution, it "does not substantially deviate from what the national Constitution provides." The forced melding of regional constitutions into the centre’s mould remains problematic insofar as it violates a territorial distribution based on the existence and autonomy of constituent entities, each constitutionally endowed with its own rights and prerogatives that do not stem from the federal state [29].
In reality, as explained by Marten van Staden, the ANC "governs South Africa, officially a federation, as if it were a unitary state." Articles 44(2) and 44(3) of Annex 5 confer on the Parliament the power to intervene in areas exclusively reserved for provinces, provided the interference is "reasonably necessary or incidental to the effective exercise of a power concerning any matter listed in Annex 4" (which lists concurrent competencies) [30]. The fiscal autonomy attributed to provincial structures, for example, remains constitutionally submitted to parliamentary approval. For this reason, many consider the effective role of the national government to emit policy-frameworks, within which provincial entities can further legislate contours, tailored to their regions. Former Chief Justice Chaskalson argued that the term 'invalidation' does not apply within the South African legal hierarchy, suggesting that two contradictory laws can remain in force simultaneously as long as provincial law does not encroach upon national law [31]. In practice, the national government retains the right to intervene forcefully or to assist provinces within the bounds of Article 146, which opens the door to an overflow of central authority, reaffirming its precedence in the vaguely defined matters of “national security... economic unity, the common market, the promotion of equal opportunity and equal access to government services... or the protection of the environment.” The culmination of these factors leaves dissenting regions increasingly feeling increasingly disempowered in their own affairs. Van Staden aptly points out a study by Victory Research (2020) in the Western Cape, showing that 67.9% of respondents want provincial governments to have more constitutional power and that 35.8% support the Western Cape becoming an independent state.
Favoured by the principle of subsidiarity, South Africa’s 257 municipalities enjoy a relatively broad range of competencies compared to other federal systems, enjoying five exclusive domains. On the ground, municipal institutions remain subjected to strong levels of provincial oversight. Pursuant to section 139, reproducing on a smaller scale the relationship established between provinces and the federal state, municipalities in South Africa are similarly required to align their legal framework with that adopted by the provincial government. Failure to fulfil these obligations or comply with national laws, as formulated by parliamentary legislation, renders them susceptible to provincial intervention.
In the South African context, the National Council of Provinces (NCOP), whose powers are delineated under sections 75 and 76 of the Constitution, serves as the second chamber of Parliament, tasked with representing the inhabitants of the nine provinces. Each province is entitled to a delegation of 10 members, who vote as individuals, except on issues directly affecting the provinces. While its decisions are subject to potential annulment by the National Assembly as per constitutional provisions, the text provides for the establishment of a mediation committee in which both chambers participate on an equal footing, thereby affirming the collaborative nature of the constitution. However, the absence of decision-making powers vested in the institution, serving merely as a platform for discussion, ensures that the outcome ultimately hinges on the assembly.
Similar to Ethiopia, South Africa's federalism, though never openly affirmed by its founding document, appears upon closer inspection to harbour an element of cynicism, insofar as its primary objective may have been to circumvent the potential breakup of the country during the 1994 transition. On one hand, it can be argued that federalism has allowed for the blossoming of diversity, liberalism, and the republican nature of the state. On the other hand, the constitutional provisions underlying a supposedly cooperative federalism seem to have been intended to enable the ANC's tentacles to reach other levels of governance within a unitary logic. The continued dominance of the ANC since 1996 has only reinforced this imbalance, a dynamic that the 2024 elections could potentially bring to an end.
The Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999)
If federalism is scarcely present in postcolonial Africa, its historical connection to the Nigerian state is unparalleled, Rotimi Suberu advancing that "Nigeria is arguably the sole African country in which federalism is deeply entrenched" [33]. At first glance, Nigeria’s demographic landscape poses significant challenges to political centralisation, encompassing over 200 ethnicities, marked notably by three predominant groups: Igbo in the Southeast, Yoruba in the Southwest, and the Hausa-Fulani conglomeration in the North, segmented by the religious divide along the north-south axis. Federal principles of governance, in one form or another, have thus been in place since the era of the British protectorate as a motor of stability for a highly heterogeneous political entity. Born in 1954, followed by independence in 1960, the first explicitly federal Nigeria was composed of three regions defined by both identitarian and economic disparities between the three major ethno-regional groups mentioned, adopting a multinational model akin to that of India, Belgium, or Canada.
However, repeated regressions to military dictatorship have led to modifications in the modalities of federalism, gradually moving away from its foundational principles, along with the proliferation of sub-federal entities, finally totaling 36 distinct regions under the 1999 Constitution, founding the Fourth Republic, and now marking the country’s longest period of democratic rule. Analysts often point to the coexistence of diametrically opposed socio-legal systems, such as the twelve northern states enforcing various interpretations of Sharia law, whilst remaining subject to the legal frameworks of the central government, to posit federalist organisation as the engine for lasting peace and the persistence of democracy. The 1999 Constitution, in spite of its proclaimed federalist vocation, certainly tips the balance towards the centre, reserving 68 powers exclusively for the federal government, in addition to 12 on the concurrent list, leaving states with a relatively limited number of residual prerogatives [34].
One might however argue that the strength of Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution resides in the formulation of an expressed Federal Character, codifying federalist aspirations at the communitarian level. Consciously avoiding the term "ethnicity," articles 14(3) and 14(4) of the Constitution stipulate requirements for equity in terms of regional representation at the federal level, equality among states, and the recognition of individual diversity. Whilst the principle, first included in the 1979 Constitution, remains somewhat vague regarding concrete provisions for its implementation, it confirms the willingness to accommodate diversity in all its forms towards the aspiration of a unified state [35]. The Federal Character thus aligns with what Elazar describes as "federal thinking," as outlined earlier, and finds explicit expression in Articles 171(5) and 223(1) of the Constitution, stipulating that the President of the Republic must respect this principle in making appointments. They must also garner more than 25% of the votes in at least two-thirds of the constituent states to be elected, leading to a series of informal agreements amongst the major regions, aimed at sidelining potential communal disputes. Suberu notes that "the division of the country into several multiethnic and sub-ethnic, rather than purely ethnic, states has cross-cut and thus moderated raw ethnic conflicts, resulting in a form of rotational presidency alternating among leaders from the three major ethnic groups.” Article 223(1) extends this logic to all governing bodies and political parties, requiring them to represent the country's diversity in their compositions. To ensure the application of the federal principle, Article 153(1) of the Constitution provides for the establishment of the Federal Character Commission, tasked with ensuring compliance with these requirements at all levels of the state, from ministerial positions to the composition of the armed forces and the leadership of public enterprises. If the consociational nature of Nigerian democracy, or the sharing of power between predefined groups, is neither mandated nor promoted by the constitution, this arrangement appears to be the de facto manifestation of the document’s explicit Federal Character and the reason behind the relative robustness of its democracy. However, as noted by Marc Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, the feasibility of this rotational equity appears to be conditioned by the centralised distribution of natural resources, a bone of fierce contention in a state dependent on oil wealth [36].
The federated states of Nigeria derive approximately 80% of their revenues from central transfers, contrasting sharply with figures of 20% in Canada or 31% in Brazil, which, although perceived as highly unjust by oil-rich Delta states, fosters a certain level of national unity, ensuring loyalty to the central state and permitting federated entities to interact on a level playing field , albeit violating any notion of financial autonomy [37]. This disposition was not initially integrated into the Nigerian model; the 1966 coup d’Etat, followed by the Biafran War the following year, pushed the state to subjugate regions, stripping them of financial and security autonomy. Since, including under the 1999 constitution, federal states have not been equipped with their own police forces, with all security matters now falling under the jurisdiction of the central government. It is thus in the Nigerian delta that the federalist cry resonates the loudest; the nine states comprising it, holding the bulk of Nigeria’s oil reserves, have been deprived of the right to benefit fully from the natural resources beneath their soil. The federated states are entitled, under the derivation principle as defined by the 1999 Constitution, to only 13% of the revenues collected within their boundaries, with the remainder paid into the state’s Federation Account. For many scholars, Nigeria's ethno-regional federalism, forming the foundation of its political organisation for over a century, is undermined by an inability to concur on the distribution of financial revenues derived from oil exploitation [38]. The impoverishment of the Niger Delta, the main source of oil fueling the national economy, highlights the contentious issue of Nigerian federalism, particularly in its fiscal dimension.
As noted by Dele Babalola, "in practice, the country operates as a unitary state," citing Wheare (1963), "a country may have a federal constitution while translating it into practice in such a way that its government is not federal." Babalola succinctly summarises: "Today's Nigeria is therefore a federation in which states are financially dependent on the centre. Thus, we witness a negation of the federal principle requiring reciprocal autonomy of governments within a federation" [39]. Whilst the federal principle implies the reciprocal independence of constituent units and the federal state, it seems that the latter has gained the upper hand in Nigeria, leading to a progressive subordination of the regions in order to maintain a consociational-democratic pact. There remains however a strong demand across the country for a more advanced federalism (“true federalism” in colloquial parlance) capable of ensuring regional autonomy at all levels. Nigeria constitutes thus a paradoxical arrangement precisely to the degree that the perpetuation of its consociational-federal nature reposes squarely upon the centralised distribution of resources, whilst the application of this redistributive practice inherently undermines the fiscal autonomy of constituent entities.
Conclusion
As we have observed, Elazar's work provides a comprehensive framework for examining the implementation of federalism worldwide. Whilst the overwhelming majority of studies in this field focus either on ideal types (such as the United States, Switzerland) or major federations (Brazil, India), sub-Saharan Africa constitutes fertile ground for the development of federalism as a driver of democratic advancement. Examples from Nigeria, Ethiopia, and South Africa each emerge within distinct post-colonial contexts. As this brief analysis has sought to demonstrate, the application of federalist principles, if suited to young heterogeneous states with centrifugal tendencies, remains susceptible, due to its flexibility, to centralising inclinations; the strongest bulwark against the erosion of federal democracy residing a robust Constitution. While each system roots itself fundamentally in a federal perspective, accommodating national diversity through rainbow nationhood, ethnic recognition, or consociationalism, they nonetheless face practical challenges, namely the influence of dominant parties, resource allocation, and jurisdictional assignments. Accordingly, if the scissiparous federalisation of the young nation states treated above illustrates a multiplicity of constitutional strategies conducive to the realisation of Stepan’s ‘holding-together federalism’ by accommodating diversity, this is hardly sufficient to consolidate the establishment of a genuine democracy.
Ryan Cauwenberghs is a graduate student at Oxford University, where he is pursuing a degree in African Studies. His research, taking him from Casablanca to Cape Town, focuses on regional integration, collective security, and political structures and processes in Africa.
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Photo Credits:
Figure 1: Elazar, D. J. (1987). The Power Pyramid. In Exploring federalism (p. 9). University of Texas Press; Elazar, D. J. (1987). The Matrix Model. In Exploring federalism (p. 10). University of Texas Press.
Figure 2: Elazar, D. J. (1987). The Center-Periphery Model. In Exploring federalism (p. 10). University of Texas Press.
Title Image: Magda Ehlers, Metal Sculpture at the Nelson Mandela Capture Site in Howick, Kwazulu Natal, South Africa
Image 1: Kim Scarborough, Ethiopian Pro-Democracy March
Image 2: Kopano Tlape, Swearing-in ceremony of new National Council of Provinces (NCOP) members during the first sitting of the NCOP house in Parliament. (Photo: GCIS)
Image 3: Peter Williams, Starving children in the Nigerian civil war
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