I. Introduction
The African Union (AU), successor to the defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU), constitutes the current, albeit avowedly sputtering, incarnation of the continent’s long held aspirations of unity, the inherently federalist character of which underpins widespread notions of a “United States of Africa” [1]. If the reality of a federalized Africa appears far from reach, the underlying inspiration has all but disappeared, and a path to political unification remains, on paper, a foundational priority of the institution. As outlined in the much-discussed Agenda 2063, a 50-year roadmap towards The Africa We Want, a "federal or confederate" arrangement remains an institutional objective [2]. Agenda 2063, taking up the mantle of practical federalism on the African continent, rests upon a series of distinct pillars, all of which merit assiduous analysis and scrutiny. However, without diving into more esoteric aspects of modern federalist theory, we will stress that any project or policy claiming to advance federalism, must come to terms with the necessity of a “federal will,” i.e. a common desire amongst citizens of the constituent entities to unite [3]. Any enterprise not stemming from this principle, no matter what terms it may drape itself in, is unlikely to advance federalist aspirations.
II. What is the AfCFTA?
Over the past decade, an astounding quantity of ink has been poured into reporting on the birth of one of the plan’s major pillars, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which promises prosperity, solidarity, and unity through the free movement of goods and people. If the concept seems familiar, this is not without reason. As the former Rwandan Minister of Finance, Louise Mushikiwabo, explicitly states, the AfCFTA draws its ideological roots from the European project, presenting itself as an African Schengen Area, the response to which has proved almost unanimously optimistic [4]. We might however contend that the tangible reality of the program is somewhat disconcerting, noting that the AfCFTA, in spite of lofty promises, appears to be much more the fruit of neoliberal logic, which, coupled with ad-hoc theoretical justification, is likely to undermine its espoused federalist ambitions.
In this case, the aforementioned European inspiration alludes more precisely to the notion of neofunctionalism, developed by German political scientist Ernst Haas to explain the process of regional integration, moving from the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) towards the European Union (EU) [5]. In a few words, the theory proposes that growing economic interdependence and the creation of a supranational market leads, by way of a spillover effect, to deepened integration in other domains of society and governance. If this manner of thinking was hotly contested at the time by certain founding fathers of the EU, such as Altiero Spinelli, partisan of a federal arrangement via direct political reorganization, diverse conceptions of neofunctionalism are now widely accepted to account for the relative successes of a unified Europe. For the African Union (formerly Organization of African Unity), the hopes of a Spinelli-style process of radical integration were dashed in 1963 with the defeat of the Casablanca Group, composed of African post-independence leaders committed to complete and rapid integration [6]. At present, leaders have willingly or unwillingly resigned themselves to the use of other means, notably the depicted neofunctionalist approach in order to attain the promised unity.
The notion of an economically integrated Africa is hardly a novel concept. Preceding the African Union itself, the Lagos Plan of Action (1980) was perhaps the first major attempt at prosperity through integration, laying the groundwork for institutionalized Regional Economic Communities (REC, see below) and giving way, in 1991, to the Treaty of Abuja, destined to unite regional groupings into an African Economic Community by 2028 [7]. If the signatories to this convention have fallen well behind on the established deadlines, the principles laid out in the accord have proven nonetheless fundamental in the shaping of the African Union, Agenda 2063, and the impetus behind the AfCFTA. Concisely, the AfCFTA, launched in 2018, will create the world’s largest free trade zone comprised of 54 states and roughly 1.3 billion inhabitants, initially eliminating tariffs on 90% of cross border exchanges within 5-10 years, as well as reducing other non-tariff barriers in order to “boost Africa’s income by $450 billion by 2035 and Lift 30 million Africans out of extreme poverty” all whilst increasing intra-African trade by 52% [8]. The specific dispositions of the agreement are of course more precise, but after general economic development, such a project would strive to “expedite the regional and continental integration processes,” drawing heavily on Europe’s experience [9].
III. Easier Said than Done
We might admit that the African Union is not inherently mistaken to conceptualize federalism as a correlate of regional integration; however, as can be derived from Rikerian theory, the link between economic motivations and a genuine desire to advance towards a federal arrangement is hardly evident. More importantly, any form of temporary unification that creates clear groups of winners and losers, turning regions and classes against their neighbors, is ultimately a step back for the eternally necessary federal will. At the global scale, the national-populist surge of the past decade, following years of economic integration and liberalization, is as good a demonstration as any that “end of history” logic is situational at best and faulty at worst. If the agreement is capable of augmenting the major metrics (ex. GDP per capita) this may all come at the expense of popular adhesion [10]. In this light, it is somewhat striking to note how enthusiastically it has been endorsed by leaders across the continent: as of today, 54 out of 55 African Union members have signed the AfCFTA agreement, with 48 having ratified. In contrast, as recent studies demonstrate, the project generates significantly less enthusiasm among citizens, who display “a general negative sentiment towards AfCFTA” compared to their respective representatives [11].
On the ground, a series of structural and systemic weaknesses, coupled with major intracontinental disparities, appears to justify the reticence of citizens. The neofunctionalist view, we remind, was at no point intended to constitute a prescriptive template for other regional bodies, and its explicative power remains increasingly limited by “spillbacks,” or popular domestic movements away from integration, such as Brexit [12]. Promises of prosperity tied to these aspirations will have to spring from the reinforcement of internal capacities; integration and unification will need to come from sincere political desire - the two cannot be merged into a neoliberal, cure-all program of free trade. The hurdles the project is likely to stumble upon are, to say the least, numerous; however, in enumerating just a select few, the broader challenge becomes visible. The agreement’s preference for pursuing, rather than adopting, a federal structure creates significant gaps in the key preliminary elements necessary for success—namely, coordination, harmonization, and relative equality.
IV. Dubious Economics
The ways in which these structural imbalances are likely to manifest themselves appear equally diverse, described most vividly as a “wall of political, economic, and geostrategic realities” [13]. To cite just a handful, we might digress upon the relative homogeneity of export goods between participating states, coupled with extremely low levels of industrialization. No other continent exhibiting similar levels of economic disparity, there is little doubt that industrialized states like South Africa, Tunisia and Egypt will have more to gain than their agriculturally reliant neighbors. How will underserved states react to a contract that includes no mechanism to compensate their losses? Or, we might evoke the highly informal nature of cross-border exchange in Africa. In certain acute cases, such as Benin’s smuggling-based “entrepôt economy,” adherence to the AfCFTA would likely engender little but domestic destabilization and a declassement of governing elites [14].
Coupled with these areas of uncertainty, the relative absence of transport infrastructure is widely recognized as a temporary roadblock to regional integration. Less often mentioned, on the other hand, is the fact that the infrastructure market created to rectify this problem is shaping up to present its own drawbacks, facilitating the rush of foreign firms into the continent and pushing states further into debt [15]. How are low-to-moderate capacity African companies to compete for state contracts on major transport infrastructure whilst national governments are free to optimize immediate return on investment by employing Chinese, French, or American giants? As reputed development economist Ignacy Sachs lays out,
"Under the influence of the example of the European Common Market, many countries in the Third World harbor unrealistic hopes about regional integrations modeled after Europe, i.e., achieved through the gradual opening of markets. In my view, this is a false track because the reduction of customs tariffs primarily benefits the expansion of multinational corporations, established within common markets, which are more powerful and better prepared to seize new opportunities" [16].
To this end, efforts to attract foreign investment through concessions on resource exploitation or favorable commercial conditions are likely to strengthen the influence of multinational corporations. These companies may take advantage of inconsistent market access policies across countries, allowing them to maximize profits in states with more lenient regulations [17]. While gross investment and productive output are likely to increase, it remains unclear how this will benefit local enterprises. In many cases, the agreement’s lack of provisions designed to facilitate responsible labour practices could act as a powerful motor of attraction for foreign firms looking to cut costs. It is hence little wonder that several unions, such as the Nigerian Labor Congress, have expressed serious concerns about the AfCFTA’s impact upon workers [18]. A lack of coordination in national labor laws, and even larger gaps in the capacity of states to enforce these rules, will only invite stakeholders to compete via more stringent working conditions. The fate of migrant laborers, many of which will be created by the AfCFTA’s free-movement provisions, from this angle, appears equally precarious. China’s preponderant influence is difficult to ignore in this domain, Oluwatosin Adeshokan remarking in Foreign Policy that “African companies do not actually have the ability to scale up to the point where they will benefit from the new trade bloc. Instead, it’s still Chinese-owned manufacturing companies that will continue to dominate” [19].
It is in this light that economist Jacques Berthelot goes as far as to describe the arrangement as a “suicidal folly,” noting that “Rather than fostering regional integration on the continent, it will only lead to its strong disintegration by widely opening the doors to multinational firms, already largely present in most countries, which will concentrate their activities in the most competitive countries, exporting to the others” [20].
Finally, if most, including those in favor of the project, concede that the continent's economic stability largely depends on its agricultural potential—currently so underexploited that Africa remains a net importer of food—then identifying concrete benefits for small-scale farmers and agricultural communities becomes challenging. With 70% of Africans relying on agriculture for their livelihoods, the shocks to supply-demand dynamics will be hard to ignore [21]. How are subsistence farmers intended to respond to the influx of non-tariffed goods from regions with higher production capacities? Those not displaced by corporate giants in the agribusiness sector will likely be forced into cash-crop cultivation, leaving them at the mercy of volatile global markets. Neither the African Union nor its member states are in a position to subsidize weak industries, especially in the agricultural sector. For those concerned, the AU's economic integration could be the final blow to fragile subsistence industries and the people who depend on them.
In light of the presented concerns, it is worth recalling the work of the most illustrious of federalist thinkers. As demonstrated in Hamilton's Report on the Subject of Manufactures, the advancement of federal principles is in no way contradictory to the protection of local and infant industries [22]. It seems thus unlikely that he would have supported a free trade agreement without the political preliminaries required to prevent overwhelming transformation to regional economies. The integration of divergent economies is not a path to federalism, but certain correlates of federalism (harmonisation and redistribution) remain indispensable, as the progression of the European Union demonstrates, to economic integration. As the American founding father so eloquently remarks, ‘The implicit strength relations and conflicts of interest prevent trade exchanges from occurring in conditions of equality... The contradiction between the interests of free traders and those of protectionists could be overcome only within the framework of a federal order” [23].
IV. Where do we go from here?
For each and every gain touted by the World Bank or African Union, we can just as easily find a loss elsewhere - and this is precisely the problem. If African states are to follow this agreement to the letter, dynamics on the ground are going to change. Many citizens are going to “win”, and many are going to “lose”. It suffices to ask the Secretary General of the AfCFTA himself, Wamkele Mene, who concedes the possibility of a “backlash… attributable to the unequal distribution of the benefits of international trade and a lack of shared and inclusive growth” [24]. These examples would take some time to unravel, but the underlying principle is hardly controversial: improperly regulated free trade tends to deepen regional imbalances and intensify disparities in development. As we have seen time and again, disadvantaged parties, be they states or socio-economic classes within them, turn more readily to nationalist and isolationist tendencies, often before any meaningful steps towards unification are achieved. In light of pronounced structural disparities between African economies, economic policy advisor Teniola Tayo predicts that “populist elements may seek to mobilise people against the agreement” [25].
Few would dispute that repeated waves of national-isolationist responses have shaken the "integrated" world over the past decade, with even its highly advanced state apparatuses still struggling to manage Trumpists and Brexiteers. The recrudescence of what might be called spillbacks, as opposed to the spillovers, predicted by neofunctionalism presage a similar fate for an African Union struggling to find its bearings. The implications for partisans of a true federalism are unmistakable: If the AfCFTA delivers on the promise of an eclosion of economic opportunity, it appears just as likely to inspire the erosion of the transnational, interclass bonds holding participant societies together. We don’t have to look far for examples. For example, Nigeria swiftly closed its borders in 2019, in clear defiance of ECOWAS' free-movement provisions, ostensibly to safeguard its domestic agricultural sector [26]. The frequency with which the preexisting economic accords across the continent have been violated demonstrates, if nothing else, that should national political stability be put on the line, leaders and elites will not hesitate to backtrack, perhaps to the point of overcorrection. The federalist project remains eternally rooted in popular consent, a federal will, shared amongst free citizens motivated by the desire to unite. Neoliberal projects to boost GDP and the haphazard application of eclectic federalist theories will not suffice to overcome this foundational principle.
Ryan Cauwenberghs is a graduate student at Oxford University, where he is pursuing a degree in African Studies.
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