

## Comments

*Stanley Sloan\*:*

*How to go forward with this initiative*

Prime Minister Balladur has put out some very important suggestions. I think they need to be heard.

It is impressive, to begin with, that he has come forward with these ideas. Political leaders have a responsibility to look beyond current problems and try to imagine the future, not to just accept the status quo. Those of us in the academic environment perhaps have a responsibility to contribute ideas; political leaders have a responsibility to try to turn ideas into action and Prime Minister Balladur has set out on that path.

As he has discovered, there is plenty of skepticism among observers, experts, and politicians here about the goal that he sets out, a very impressive goal. I am familiar with the resistance that he has talked about to these kinds of ideas. I myself am an unreconstructed Atlanticist; I think the values, the interests and the futures of the United States and Europe are inextricably linked. It may not always be convenient to say this, it may not always be politically correct, it may even appear not to be true at times when we argue with each other, but I believe that is the bottom line of our relationship.

Nearly a decade ago I was working on an interpretive history of the transatlantic relationship. At the end of my book, after trying to do what I could have done at the Congressional Research Service—an objective, non-partisan analysis—I advocated an Atlantic Community Treaty Organization. One of the questions that I was asked was: What would this organization do? What kinds of meetings would it have? Put some meat on the bones. And so I prepared a draft of a new Atlantic Community Treaty, spelling out the terms of it, discussing how it would work and how after 9/11 it would have helped the United State and Europe respond to the attacks. Then there was this interesting response: Some very bright and intelligent American and European diplomats said, we've got so many meetings already, we've got so many organizations already, how could I convince my Minister to approve another organization, another set of meetings? I would respond by saying, I can come up with several of these organizations and meetings that probably could be eliminated and make plenty of time in your Minister's schedule. Then of course you incur the wrath of those people who have a stake in *those* organizations—but in any case, I understand very well the kind of criticism that you are encountering.

It is of course not unreasonable to ask those of use who are proposing a new organization to suggest ways of making it manageable as part of the relationship. It is one of the challenges in following up on this kind of proposal.

Another question I encountered when putting together my proposal, and that is relevant also to the Prime Minister's, was: Who you would include in this organization?

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I concluded that the best way to start would be to start with all of the members of the European Union and all of the members of NATO. If you just make the arrangement between the United States and the European Union, you leave out countries that really ought to be included—Canada, Turkey, Norway—while some European Union countries in turn are not members of NATO. I would suggest this perhaps as an amendment to the Prime Minister’s proposal. The details, as the Prime Minister said, can be discussed; it is the principle that is important: the principle of intensified cooperation between the United States and Europe.

There is a problem in requiring that Europe get its act together, by approving the Treaty of Lisbon, before embarking on this intensified transatlantic cooperation. The fact that the Lisbon Treaty faces an uncertain future reminds me of how important it is to look at European integration as a process.

It is something I made note of many years ago, when drafting the first-ever formal estimate by the U.S. intelligence community on European integration. Following Henry Kissinger’s declaration that 1973 would be the “year of Europe” in U.S. foreign policy, the intelligence community decided to produce an estimate on the European Community’s future. As a European analyst at the CIA, in between assignments to the U.S. delegation to East-West troop reduction talks in Vienna, I was designated to draft the estimate. In the draft, I used an expression that had been used by a few academics but which had not been prominent in U.S. government assessments, referring to the dynamic in Europe as that of a “uniting Europe.” The draft (and completed estimate) concluded that the final outcome of the process might remain very unclear for many years and could face a variety of advances and setbacks.

My point is that we should not wait for any particular development in the process of European integration before taking steps to intensify transatlantic cooperation. The European Union will continue to evolve toward an undefined end point; it is critically important that its further evolution take place within the framework of effective Atlantic community collaboration.

It is also important, if this idea moves ahead, that it move as something that is being done because it is seen as being consistent with the values and interests of the United States and Europe, and also in the best interests of peace and well being in the international community. It should not be done in a framework of creating new enemies. It should be a positive initiative. One can make it clear that other countries, if they are acting in ways consistent with the principles, would be welcome, if not to become members, certainly to become cooperating partners in this effort.

That said, I think it is a very constructive initiative and I hope the principle of enhanced cooperation helps guide the future of US-European relations in the coming US administration.

#### **Edouard Balladur: Response to Stanley Sloan**

It is true that this is a proposal that has triggered a certain degree of skepticism. This form of the skepticism is not the same in Europe and in the US. In the US, the response would mainly be, why would we need this? Things are going pretty well. In Europe and in particular France, there is another feeling, which is that you do not want to find yourself trapped into an exclusive relationship with the United States. There is the idea that Europe is also about relations with Russia and with the Mediterranean region, and you would not want this framework to undermine such relations.





If we are candid here you might also want to mention the sense of distrust vis-a-vis the United States because the United States is very powerful, and because you get this impression that the United States prefers to speak with different partners taken in isolation rather than taken together. But what I am advocating here is a balanced relationship with two partners on equal footing where we have populations which are about the same, and economic outputs which are about the same. Militarily there is a big difference because the US makes an effort that the Europeans are not making, even though they will have to in the future; again the idea is to have a balanced relationship. In order to have this, first of all we need Europe to organize itself, and also to make efforts which it has not made.

Now regarding this new organization and the idea that you would want to include all of the member states of NATO. Well, why not? In Europe we have the notion of various circles: those who are part of the European Union, and those who are doing additional important things such as the euro. Half of the European Union members are part of the euro zone. And then we have the other countries, which have various special arrangements for cooperation. We have just suggested for instance an enhanced type of cooperation with Ukraine. We have the same type of relationship with Turkey as well as with a number of North African states. So there are a number of relations between Europe and its neighbors. Now, how would you want these neighbors, such as Turkey, Ukraine, or Norway to be represented? That's something that we would need to discuss. I do believe that you would want to have some type of representation for these states. You would not want to have a separation here.

**Daniel Hamilton\*:**

***Union must build on the Atlantic acquis***

This is a courageous effort by the Prime Minister. The easiest thing to do would be to criticize it, by pointing to all of the differences in policy across the Atlantic, or to underlying trends, demographic or economic or political, that might be pulling us apart. But that would distract us. We need to look at the proposal and what it might mean for us.

When you put forward a proposal like this, it is of course hard to outline everything in advance. Still one can ask: What would this Union actually consist of? How would it come about from where we are today? What is the foundation upon which to build?

I believe there is a foundation. One way to think about it is to use Euro jargon. In the European Union one talks about the 'acquis', the accumulation of what Europe has achieved in integration, with all the principals and regulations that comprise the European Union today, and that those who aspire to join have to sign up to. I would argue that there is also such a thing as an 'acquis Atlantique'. It is not written down as much, certainly not in the lengthy volumes that the EU has come up with, but it is the foundation upon which one can build. A former student of David Calleo at SAIS, a

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German national named Peter Barschdorff<sup>2</sup>, has written a dissertation on the ‘*acquis Atlantique*’. He includes documents, dating from the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 to the Transatlantic declaration of 1990 when the Cold War was ending, and the new Transatlantic agenda between the US and the EU in 1995. I would add the Washington declaration of 1999, with its short statement of common principles and norms.

We say all the time that we agree on these principles, but when one looks at them, one sees there are some basic principles and processes that, having evolved over time, affect how a proposal like the present one would work. One is nondiscrimination, a core principle that would have to be applied. Another, which had to become a reality after the end of the Cold War, is what I would call ‘the open door’: this community is open, undefined in its end state, and others could join if they meet the criteria and the principles the others have evolved. Another is, to keep your word and carry out your agreements. Finally, a process that you could call constructive abstention: if you don’t agree with where the basic community is going, don’t try to undermine it, step back, opt out on some aspect, but don’t hold the whole thing up.

We don’t always honor these processes, on either side of the Atlantic; often they are honored in a breach. But when we do dishonor them by some action or other, the reaction says something about the relation. The reaction of the partner is not often, ‘why did you do that?’ it’s usually, ‘how could you have done that?’ It is a very different reaction than we have with many other countries. The expectation is that the members are going to follow these practices. It is a more emotional relationship; the closest relationships are the ones that contain the most emotion. The biggest arguments are usually the ones in the family. This underscores the notion that there is something real here, a foundation upon which one could build if one wished.

Today we are in a different world. It is an open but fleeting moment. One could try to identify elements to reshape the agenda. As to a forum in which that could take place, it would seem to me that we do need some sort of way in which all EU and NATO member states would be able to talk to each other and not be split up.

When I was in the State Department, we used to go around with what we called the ‘Euro mess’. It simply showed all of the circles of the European countries and who is in what group. Actually, the fact that there are overlapping, integrated institutions creates a certain sense of security, so let’s not worry if institutions overlap, it’s whether they are doing anything that is the issue.

The institutions were geared back then to a particular transformation, that of stabilizing the European continent. That was most of our agenda. Today our agenda is still that in the wider Europe, but it is not such an overwhelming part of our agenda. We have a whole new agenda about the world at large. Now the question is whether Europeans and Americans are prepared to work together to deal with a major range of issues beyond Europe that neither one of us can deal with alone very well.

There is yet one more agenda, which is in fact an objective reality: that we are not drifting apart when it comes to our societies, we are virtually colliding. The integration between our two continents is much greater today than it was during the Cold War. In terms of the integrative factors, we’ve become much closer together than ever before in

<sup>2</sup> The work has been published: Peter Barschdorff, *Facilitating Transatlantic Cooperation After The Cold War: An Acquis Atlantique* (New York, Palgrave, 2001), also [http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/search-handle-url/ref=ntt\\_athr\\_dp\\_sr\\_1?%5Fencoding=UTF8&search-type=ss&index=books&field-author=Peter%20Barschdorff](http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/search-handle-url/ref=ntt_athr_dp_sr_1?%5Fencoding=UTF8&search-type=ss&index=books&field-author=Peter%20Barschdorff) [Ed.]





our history. We're more tied to each other and have a greater stake in each other's economic success than we have ever had before.

There are initiatives underway to tackle the agenda posed by this reality. But as yet they don't have the sense of lift, or the sense of priority, that the Prime Minister is trying to give. That is the distinctive element of his proposal.

If you look at the New Transatlantic Agenda, the basic framework for US-EU relations as agreed in 1995, it is very ambitious in scope. It has all sorts of things we should have been doing. It has one hundred and fifty joint actions we should be taking. But if you go to these meetings, you see that the principals sit there with a brief and look dully at it. They have part of a day; every issue takes up about thirty seconds of their time. There has been some improvement, but it is a process without direction. There is not a sense of prioritization. There is not a strategic point to it; the US-EU relationship is still non-strategic. It has not got this sense that the alliance used to have. It needs a different type of focus. And it needs to be redone.

The Prime Minister proposes an integrated transatlantic market. Today there is the Transatlantic Economic Council, and that is exactly, almost obsessively, what it is supposed to be doing: to start to clear away barriers. The model is not a trade agreement but a single transatlantic market as a goal. And yet where are we? We are hung up on the definition of what constitutes a clean chicken. This is what is holding up the single market across the Atlantic. Unfortunately it is a Franco-American issue. This is the reality: if people are not really committed to the goal and the priority, 'clean chickens' will define your agenda. It becomes ludicrous. That is where we stand.

We have to reflect: what is distinctive about this relationship today in the world that we are in, rather than the world that we were in? It is distinctive at least in one sense: if we do agree across the Atlantic, we are almost always the core of a global coalition that gets something done. And if we disagree across the Atlantic, we are almost always the brake on any global coalition that gets anything done. We cannot say that about any other relationship. That is still what makes this relationship distinctive.

Further: the US might believe it is the indispensable power, and we might also believe that this relationship is indispensable. Yet even this is insufficient. We can get together; in the end we need also to get together with others. If we try to define the West against the rest, or without the rest, we will end up with a world without the West. The principle of nondiscrimination, open door, or inclusion has to be part of this. We often can lead the way on issues but the others have to come along. We have to restructure our institutions to take account of the changing calculus of power. Somehow this has to be done with the notion that others are involved and can participate, and are equal players. If we can do that, then together we can extend our influence. And we can advance our values and interests.

#### **Edouard Balladur: Response to Hamilton**

You are quite right: there is an "acquis Atlantique", and a very significant one at that. In the military field and in a number of fields there is an *acquis Atlantique*. It is extremely helpful; we would have to draw on that.

But at the same time, I have to be extremely clear here: It is not based on the Atlantic Alliance that we can come up with this Union. The Atlantic Alliance is a very useful one, it has been useful in the past and it still is, but it bears the marks of its origin, since it was built in the framework of the Cold War in order to protect Europe.

Anything based upon the Atlantic Alliance would seem a little backward looking in the minds of public opinion. We should take it into account, but not use it as the starting point. That is why I am talking about a new organization that would of course include NATO but is not based on it and doesn't take it as a starting point.

You also spoke of a common market. It is exactly what I actually had in mind. I think we need to come up with an Atlantic common market, with rules regarding competition, rules regarding trade legislation and tax legislation, rules that make it possible for us to operate it smoothly.

Regarding the open door, I don't think you can close a door forever; however, you can close a door for a limited time or temporarily. I think that the enlargement of EU today is no longer possible, there are twenty seven of us, that is a lot. A number of members have not yet reached normal living standards in Europe. We don't want to go too fast, otherwise we would be creating a number of problems. I would venture that nothing more is possible until the Lisbon Treaty is ratified.

At the same time, I go back to this notion of circles that we have in Europe. It allows us to bring aboard a number of neighboring countries that are not part of the EU, through association treaties that deal with financial issues and trade issues.

I have always been against saying that we need to set the final geographic borders of the Union. I am not in favor of saying, 'this is who is a European, and this is who is not a European, this is who is a member of the Atlantic Alliance, and this is who is not'. Rather, it is an open question. I would start with the obvious states, and then gradually over the years we will see what problems arise and how we want to solve them.

