

FREEDOM & UNION

Journal of The Streit Council for a Union of Democracies

Series II – Vol. I, No. 2, Summer 2006

Emerging Transformation in the Atlantic Community

Articles by:

**Stanley Sloan
Lyubomir Ivanov
Ira Straus
James Huntley
Tiziana Stella
Dario Zuddu**

Recent Events in Transatlantic Relations

January 25, 2005 *Department of Homeland Security Assigns Fulltime Attaché to EU*

Following a public announcement by former Secretary Tom Ridge, the US DHS sends a fulltime attaché to the European Union (EU) to assure department and EU leaders' "constant communication on an operational level."

June 20, 2005 *EU-US Summit in Washington, DC*

At the EU-US Summit held in Washington, leaders agree to set up a High Level Regulatory Co-operation between EU and US respective legislative bodies, with delegations participating in the law-making process of their counterpart. The summit also sets out to powerfully enhance transatlantic trade and investment.

September 19, 2005 *NATO and UN to Strengthen Cooperation*

NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer visits the UN on September 19 and 20 to discuss current operations and ideas for enhancing NATO-UN cooperation with Secretary General Kofi Annan. The two Secretary Generals also discuss ideas for enhancing NATO-UN relations and agree to pursue a deeper and more structured relationship between the two organizations.

November 15, 2005 *Resolution 337 on Enhanced Common Funding of NATO Operations*

The NATO parliamentary Assembly calls for the Allies to adjust their defense budgets to the new NATO strategic tasks.

December 9, 2005 *DHS Issues a Grant for Research on International and Transatlantic Aspects of Homeland Security*

The Center for Transatlantic Relations of the P. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University is to lead research toward a common transatlantic homeland security.

February 1, 2006 *NATO Successfully Completes Pakistan Earthquake Relief Operation*

NATO accomplishes the delivery of the first disaster relief operation. After the devastating earthquake of October 8, 2005, NATO airlifted close to 3,500 tons of urgently-needed supplies to Pakistan and deployed engineers, medical units and specialist equipment to assist in relief operations.

February 2, 2006 *NATO Mulls Expansion at Munich Security Conference*

As more than 300 defense ministers and top security officials meet in Munich, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer says that Japan and South Korea are both interested in strengthening their relationship with the Alliance. Declarations add to Australia's expression of interest.

April 28, 2006 *State Department Praises the EU in Country Reports on Terrorism*

The US State Department releases the 2005 Country Reports on Terrorism. In it, US officials commend the EU cooperation in the fight against terror.

June 2, 2006 *The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Signs a Preliminary Deal to Merge With the Pan-European Euronext Exchange*

A definitive deal between NYSE and Euronext, if approved, would create the first transatlantic stock market. Under the agreement, each NYSE share would convert into one share of common stock in the merged company, to be renamed NYSE Euronext. The EU is eventually expected to rule on the merger. The agreement would set up the world's largest and most liquid securities marketplace with a combined market capitalization of around \$20 billion.

June 21, 2006 *EU-US Summit in Vienna*

European Commission President José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Council and Austrian Chancellor Wolfgang Schäussel and US President George W. Bush met in Vienna for the annual EU-US Summit. Leaders on both sides have pointed to the remarkable achievements in US-EU cooperation since the previous summit. The EU-US Regulatory Roadmap has progressed notably by establishing the EU-US High-Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum. American and European officials have restated their common position on Iran and the Middle East. Transatlantic partners have agreed on a Joint Action on intellectual property rights and signed a new Higher Education, Vocational Training Agreement allowing for a great expansion of education exchange programs.

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
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FREEDOM & UNION is published by the Streit Council for a Union of Democracies, Inc. Officers, Don Dennis, President, D. Bruce Shine, Vice-President, Neal Potter, Chair, Edward Rawson, Vice-Chair.
Editor, Tiziana Stella.
Assistant Editor, Todd Linton.
Authors' opinions do not necessarily reflect

Greetings from London

Bravo for the first edition of the reborn *Freedom & Union*.



Perhaps you could make your readers aware that the European Union has many federal elements which make it an effective partner of the US in much of the economic field (although as Zuddu rightly observes the European deficient governance prevents it from playing its full part in the governance of the world monetary system.)

With my best wishes,
John

John Pinder is Chairman of the Federal Trust, London; Honorary Professor at the College of Europe, Bruges and Honorary President of the Union of European Federalists.

He is the author of numerous books, including *The Building of the European Union*, *The European Union: a Very Short Introduction*, and *Federal Union: The Pioneers, A History of Federal Union*.

Freedom & Union's Policy

To think, write and act always in terms of all the democratic world, and not of any country in it.

To mean by "we" (except editorially) the citizens of the coming Atlantic Union or Federation of All the Free, not merely those of any existing democracy.

We are proud to continue Freedom & Union's enduring editorial policy which is reprinted in part here in its original wording. – Ed.

The Transatlantic Community: Reasons for Optimism

BY DARIO ZUDDU

“**T**ransatlantic Community” is a term that describes the complex set of institutions, forms of co-operation, shared values and strategic views that shape the relationship between the USA and Europe. The Transatlantic Community has found one of its most prominent institutional expressions in NATO. The Alliance has proven capable of outliving its primary mission of deterring the Soviet Union. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has undergone an internal and external transformation. Eastern European countries from the former Soviet bloc have joined the Alliance, which has also acquired new tasks in terms of peacekeeping operations and disaster relief. Transatlantic partners have also broadened their economic integration. In spite of the rise of large, third-party economic players, the US and Europe account by far for the bulk of world trade and investment. Far from declining, reciprocal transatlantic investment has escalated in the last decade, passing the impressive amount of \$1.8 trillion.

The special nature and importance of the transatlantic relationship also cause the US and many European countries to act as the driving force in key multilateral institutions. Whether the matter is politics, security, economics or academic debate, the US and Europe often set the agenda of such different organizations as the UN, the WTO, the OSCE and the OECD. Agreement or disagreement between transatlantic partners ultimately determines whether these organizations

work or fail. In this sense, the Transatlantic Community acts as the engine of global change and development.

None of the achievements described above would have been possible without a fundamental cultural sharing and understanding. That is the actual rationale behind the very idea of a transatlantic community. Nevertheless, recent events, and the reemergence of long delayed issues, have increasingly challenged transatlantic relations. Occasionally, the relevance of the Transatlantic Community has come into question. Strategic divergences over the Middle East, the rise of new global players like China and India, disputes over climate change and the International Criminal Court have all caused some commentators to discount the transatlantic relationship.

The truth is that the USA and Europe have so far overcome their disagreements, displaying a notable ability to evolve and adapt to new challenges. The remarkable achievements in terms of security and economic integration, spelled out above, have taken place during the same difficult moments for the transatlantic partnership. More importantly, the Transatlantic Community is broadening by undertaking new commitments and initiatives.

As early as December 1995, the USA and EU launched The New Transatlantic Agenda, aiming at unprecedented heights of institutional integration at every level of transatlantic co-operation. The wording of the New Agenda’s introductory remarks is self-commenting: “[...] *Today we face new challenges at home and abroad. To meet them, we must further strengthen and adapt*



Picture credit: Enterprise Europe Online

the partnership that has served us so well. Domestic challenges are not an excuse to turn inward; we can learn from each other's experiences and build new transatlantic bridges. We must first of all seize the opportunity presented by Europe's historic transformation to consolidate democracy and free-market economies throughout the continent."

Additionally, not all of the recent disagreements have undermined the US-Europe relationship. On the contrary, they have represented a powerful motive behind the evolution of the Transatlantic Community. For example, the new threat of terrorism has tested the ability of the Allies to devise a common strategy. By the same token, however, it has also brought about enhanced security cooperation. Concrete, institutional steps have been taken to establish a Transatlantic Homeland Security. The Allies have also implemented measures to create anti-terrorism tasks and units within existing transatlantic institutions.


Similarly, current economic globalization has sparked investment and new opportunities in areas other than the transatlantic region, namely China. At the same time, though, world trade and capital liberalization have provided opportunities to deepen transatlantic economic integration. New initiatives, such as The New Transatlantic Marketplace begun in 1998, have set the ground for the future creation of a Transatlantic Market.

In conclusion, the real question is not whether a Transatlantic Community is of any relevance today, but what can be done to reinforce it. What new tasks are necessary for existing transatlantic institutions? What new institutions should be devised to build up the Transatlantic Community? What about a common transatlantic foreign policy? Equally important, how can the Transatlantic Community expand as to include new members?

Dario is a Fellow with the Streit Council

"The real question is not whether a Transatlantic Community is of any relevance today, but what can be done to reinforce it."

PERCENTAGE OF EUROPEANS (EU9) THAT THINK A MORE POWERFUL EUROPEAN UNION SHOULD COMPETE OR COOPERATE WITH THE US



Large majority of Europeans want EU to cooperate with U.S.

While 55% of Europeans (EU9) want to take a more independent approach in security and diplomatic affairs, this does not imply competing with the United States. On the contrary, our data show that a large majority (80%) of Europeans (EU9) want a more powerful EU to cooperate rather than compete with the United States.

Source: German Marshall Fund, *Transatlantic Trends*, 2005

Taking the Atlantic Community Beyond NATO Transformation

By
Stanley R. Sloan



Dr. Sloan is Director of the Atlantic Community Initiative, Visiting Scholar at Middlebury College's Rohatyn Center for International Affairs, and a member of the Streit Council's Advisory Council.

NATO has been embarked on an impressive process of transformation, largely by taking on new roles and missions that have required dramatic changes in how alliance leaders think and how the alliance operates. Now, the NATO members need to move beyond thinking solely in the NATO box, and develop new forms of cooperation that respond to the security challenges that NATO and European Union members face today.

For a start, the transatlantic democracies need to breathe new life into the sense of common destiny among the Atlantic community of nations. This is a bigger task than simply reaffirming the goal of NATO unity, avoiding disastrous unilateralist policies, or tinkering with NATO's method of operations. It requires policies that reflect and acknowledge the mutual dependence and shared values that still make the Euro-Atlantic community special.

It is increasingly clear that the challenges faced by the Euro-Atlantic allies cannot be managed effectively within NATO's narrow confines or even in a treaty between the United States and members of the European Union (EU), which would leave out Canada and important European allies, such as Norway and Turkey. Furthermore, the US-EU bilateral relationship has a distinctly functional nature—it is mostly about the important but mainly technical details of US-EU relations and has very little political

prominence or association with broader goals and values.

The diverse nature of twenty-first-century issues affecting allied interests suggests the need for a new initiative designed to broaden the context of the transatlantic relationship. The point of doing so would be to give form and substance to the apparent belief of all allied governments that, even in the absence of a Soviet threat and in the face of new terrorist challenges, they continue to share — and need to defend — many values, goals, and interests.

Convincing Americans and Europeans to expand the Euro-Atlantic relationship beyond NATO and bilateral US-EU ties would not be an easy task. For most Americans, NATO is the transatlantic relationship. But that relationship is more than just NATO, even though NATO has effectively carried most of the burden of relations for more than fifty years. It is also more than is captured by the growing bilateral US relationship with the European Union, which increasingly represents not only united European economic but also political and now security views in dealings with the United States. But the European Union does not yet include all European democracies, and different views of Europe's future among its members suggest that it will be years, if not decades, before the European Union equals "Europe" in all its aspects.

The Atlantic Community of transatlantic democracies still represents a core of values and interests that is unique, even if imperfect. Some might question whether the community's value foundation remains as strong as it once was and argue that new and important perceptions of interests increasingly divide America from Europe, particularly after Iraq. Nevertheless, the United States still has more in common with its transatlantic allies—from historical roots to contemporary interests—than with any other single nation or group of countries in the world. No single

country has as much in common with Europe or is more important to Europe than is the United States. The simple fact is that the US-European relationship constitutes the vital core of international relations: the international system only works well if the United States and its European allies are working together.

Over the decades, successive administrations in the United States and in Europe have been preoccupied, not unreasonably, largely with the short term. This may once again be the fate for the Riga meeting. Creation of a new Atlantic Community would require leaders to gamble on a long term vision of continued and strengthened transatlantic partnership with new institutions to supplement the old ones. Such an initiative would require foresight and leadership that all too often is missing in US and European government policies.

Nevertheless, the transatlantic idea is not likely to die. Even as the alliance tries to cope with the demands of the war on terrorism, Middle East war and peace issues, relations with Russia, and the EU–NATO relationship, the United States and its allies should consider the need for a new Atlantic Community Treaty. Such a treaty could draw on the expressions of common values and shared interests articulated in the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty that established NATO. It could reflect a contemporary appreciation of those values and interests and should include all members of the European Union and NATO.¹

The mission of the new organization would be to support and encourage consultations and cooperation among all NATO and European Union members on non-military aspects of their security. Military aspects would continue to be handled primarily by NATO in concert with whatever cooperation developments at the EU level.

Operation of a new Atlantic Community could include the organization of twice-yearly summit meetings among all members of NATO and the European Union as well as observers from any countries recognized as candidates for membership in those two bodies. The meetings could be scheduled in conjunction with the regular NATO and EU summits and would supplant the current US–EU summit meetings. The summit framework could be supported by a per-

manent council to discuss issues as they develop between summit sessions and working groups that meet as needed.

Approaching problems and issues from the broad perspective offered by an Atlantic Community framework would open up possibilities for discussions of issues that are discussed unofficially among allied representatives at NATO but are not within NATO's formal mandate. In an Atlantic Community forum, there would be a better opportunity for a dynamic problem-solving synergy to develop when all aspects of issues can be put on the table. The war against terrorism is a good example. If there had been an Atlantic Community Council on September 11, it could immediately have established working groups to address all aspects of the campaign against sources of international terror. The North Atlantic Council would not have been required to wait for the Atlantic Community

Creation of a new Atlantic Community would require leaders to gamble on a long term vision of continued and strengthened transatlantic partnership with new institutions to supplement the old ones.

Council to act and could have invoked Article 5 on September 12 just as it did. However, in the meantime, discussions in the Atlantic Community Council could have been coordinating the response of police authorities in Community countries, discussing actions to cut off sources of financial support to terrorists, developing public diplomacy themes to accompany military and diplomatic action, and beginning consideration of long-term strategies designed to undermine support for terrorist activities.

A new Atlantic Community would embrace, not replace, NATO in the overall framework of transatlantic relations. Because it would be a consultative forum only, it would not threaten the “autonomy” of the European Union or undermine NATO's Article 5 collective defense commitment. In fact, it could help bridge the current artificial gap between NATO discussions of security policy and US–EU consultations on economic issues, which have important overlapping dimensions.

Because an Atlantic Community organization would encourage members to address issues that NATO does not tackle, the new structure would provide added value beyond that offered by the tradi-

tional alliance. It might also provide some additional options for shaping coalitions willing to deal with new security challenges in cases where using the NATO framework might not be acceptable to all allies and where action could be blocked by a single dissenting member.

Such an initiative would admittedly face some tough questions. Some critics might ask what another “talk shop” among the Western democracies would accomplish. Would consultations in the Atlantic Community framework eventually take precedence over those in NATO’s North Atlantic Council? Would such a forum have avoided Euro-Atlantic differences over Bosnia and Kosovo or Iraq? Would discussions in such a forum contribute to the settlement of transatlantic economic issues? Would US participation in such a setting simply add to the expense of US international involvement? Some might question whether the proposal is an attempt to substitute process (more consultations) for a diminishing substance (common interests) in the relationship. Others might charge that such a community would threaten the “autonomy” of the European Union, others that the United States would be sacrificing sovereignty.

The answer to all these questions is that no one outcome is guaranteed, and all such questions will be answered by the choices made by participating governments. Some in Europe and in the United States might prefer to move away from alliance and toward something more like a “handshake relationship” in which cooperation continues but in a more ad hoc, less institutionalized setting. This formula might yield greater freedom of maneuver for the United States and a uniting Europe but would also likely produce more tensions and frictions, given the lack of a solemn commitment to cooperation as a frame of reference.

These questions and issues should all be considered in a debate on the need for a new Atlantic Community. The point, however, is that such a debate is required. No consultative arrangement will guarantee that the United States and Europe will be able to solve all problems between them. But without a renewed commitment to community and without the necessary institutional settings for dialogue and cooperation, the foundations of the transatlantic relationship could be at risk.

In 2006, the transatlantic bargain remains a criti-

cal, valid framework for the United States, Canada, and the European democracies. The bargain survived the Cold War and after by adapting to changing circumstances. Now Euro-Atlantic leaders need to face up to the need to adapt their bargain to the demanding challenges of the twenty-first-century world.

The idea of creating a new Atlantic Community organization may remain beyond the political will and energy of the Euro-Atlantic democracies at Riga. However, the story that began following World War II and that has led to an unprecedented level of cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic area is far from over. The future relevance and vitality of the bargain will depend on whether it continues to grow and adapt its institutions and processes to changing international circumstances. □

¹For a detailed explanation of how the North Atlantic Treaty’s text could be adjusted to form the basis for a new Atlantic Community Treaty, see *NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community...*, p. 250-53.



NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged
By Stanley R. Sloan
(Rowman and Littlefield, 2005)

Now, fully revised and updated, this full interpretive history of the transatlantic alliance explores critical developments in U.S.-European relations and inter-democracy cooperation. Stanley R. Sloan analyzes the consequences of U.S. in the transatlantic debate over Iraq. At the same time however the United States and Europe have made historic choices concerning NATO’s future, not only continuing the process of enlarging alliance membership to other democracies, but also expanding the concept of NATO’s missions to include peacekeeping and enforcement without geographic limitation. Sloan also enlarges on his ideas for a new Euro-Atlantic pact, a call that has now been echoing in both European and American quarters. Assessing both the good and bad news for the alliance, this book offers a thought-provoking reading for all citizens concerned about future US foreign policy and Europe’s role in it.

Global Threats, Atlantic Structures

by Tiziana Stella

Once again transatlantic matters are moving forward with fresh energy. Since its institutionalization in 1949, after half a century of gestation, the Atlantic Alliance has gone through three major phases: first the Cold War, second the enlargement to Eastern Europe, a process not entirely completed, and now a phase of global reach and intensified restructuring. Meeting the test of this third phase depends upon three factors: matching the scope of the task ahead with innovative solutions –anchoring them to the framework of previous commitments – and dealing with unresolved old business.

Despite the divergences in sentiment on the two sides of the Atlantic in recent years – which have not been unusual in Alliance history – basic sentiments are falling into compatible places. “Unilateralism is out. Effective multilateralism is in,” said Daniel Fried, assistant secretary of state for European affairs, on May 2, 2006. Much has been written about the “transatlantic drift” in the last few years. Spurred by the debate between unilateralism and multilateralism, the discussion has led to a new reality today: both Europe and the US recognize in principle that effective multilateralism is the basis for successful cumulative results. However to make this declaration of principles an operational reality the transatlantic community has to undergo a series of changes. Many of the recent proposals touch upon one or more of

the necessary changes. In fact, after a phase of stagnation, there is currently an abundance of new thinking flourishing in the transatlantic world.

However the most pressing need is to develop a unified and common transatlantic perspective, within which the new proposed arrangements would fall into place as part of an overall end vision, instead of proceeding or not as individual measures of upgrading. But, without setting into motion processes toward a bolder vision of transatlantic union, even full implementation of current proposals would not be sufficient to bring about such perspective.

The tasks ahead can be divided into four areas in each of which proposals for reform are on the table.

First, dealing with much delayed internal adjustments in the transatlantic structures. These include revision of decision-making procedures, enhancing common funding, and willingness to delegate to NATO more of the operational aspects of commonly agreed upon missions. They were initially discussed in the 1950s but returned in the 1990s when NATO changed, in the words of Jamie Shea, from a “preparation” institution to a “performance” institution.

Second, development of common external vision, through an incipient common foreign policy, as is indispensable in an era of out-of-area missions. To conduct successful action the transatlantic world needs to look outward through a single set of lenses. Joint strategic review and planning processes need to be deepened, along with internal mechanisms for

This article is based on a paper prepared for an international conference that took place on April 4-5 in Sofia, Bulgaria. The conference, entitled “The Atlantic Community in the 21st Century: The Power of Values and the Value of Power,” marked the 15th anniversary of the organized Atlantic movement in Central and Eastern Europe, and was organized by the Atlantic Club of Bulgaria with the patronage of Georgi Parvanov, the President of Bulgaria, and the cooperation of the Bulgarian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense. Among those in attendance were Solomon Passy, the former Bulgarian Foreign Minister; Dr. Jean Fournet, the NATO Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy; Dr. Valeri Rachev, the Bulgarian Ambassador to Iraq and Vesselin Bliznakov, the Bulgarian Minister of Defense. The full proceedings of the conference will be published in a book.

adapting and updating the shared conclusions and keeping outlooks together. Otherwise it will be hard to give reliable substance to the phrase “effective multilateralism”. At the base level, it is necessary to forge the elements of a “transatlantic identity” able to reach the public at large.

Third, development of a unified transatlantic view on “the global role” of NATO. New global threats will continue to affect the transformation of transatlantic structures. No deep transatlantic perspective could long endure absent a shared global perspective. The alliance survived for decades while diverging frequently over out-of-area issues, but that was when core NATO-area conventional defense issues were central. Today out of area military and foreign policy issues are central for core area security. Moreover, complex diplomatic actions are involved in extending the alliance to areas beyond the Euro-Atlantic region. Absent a sufficiently unified perspective, there is the danger that internal disagreements, compounded by the resistance of external powers that fear the process, will bring the process to stall.

Fourth, increased cooperation between the Atlantic and global levels of institutions. These two levels are both critically important in global affairs, and the future of global management depends largely on the extent to which they work together. There is plenty of space for strengthening the UN-NATO relationship and for more effective coordination of actions on peacekeeping and security.

Real steps have already been taken in each area, and proposals for further development are underway. The challenge ahead is no longer a lack of vision, in fact for the first time since the end of the Cold War the transatlantic world has elaborated the starting points of a comprehensive New Atlanticism with a concept of deepening as well as widening the alliance.

1. Internal Adjustments

Ever since the first tranche of post-1991 NATO enlargement, the adequacy of decision-making pro-

cedures has been a subject of discussion. The argument, for those supporting its reform, is that with more members NATO will become less viable as “consensus” will be more difficult to achieve. Several options have been proposed, ranging from consensus minus one or two, to “constructive abstention”, or in some cases even qualified majority. This remains, up to now, unresolved old business, but one that calls for special attention. Unilateral action occurs more often when common structures are paralyzed by slow decision making. Multilateralism to be effective needs, among other things, to rest on reliable and fast decision-making procedures. Progress in this direction will inescapably have to pass through some change in decision-making procedures. The need is increased by current speculations to include in NATO countries beyond the traditional Euro-Atlantic area that could slow NATO decision making down due to broader strategic divergences.

A second internal adjustment under discussion today is NATO funding. This too is needed if NATO and its newly created NATO Response Force are to perform adequately in the new era. The issue is intertwined with decision-making adjustments. In recent years the problem has arisen on more and more occasions. General Jones, NATO Supreme Commander in Europe, has been “campaigning” strenuously to bring attention to this matter, followed by NATO Secretary General De Hoop-Scheffer, and by Victoria Nuland, U.S. Ambassador to NATO. Recently leading figures in the U.S. military have also pointed to the urgency of the question.

Recently two major U.S. officers, commenting on what was learned through the microcosm of the NATO Training Mission - Iraq (NTM-I) experience, highlighted a series of problems flowing from current funding and decision-making procedures and called for “rethinking the 50-year policy of consensus decision-making.” Their observations stressed how the growing gap between strategic and operational concepts on the one hand, and funding mechanisms on the other, may indeed lead NATO operations to disaster. (*See opposite page*)

The “executive side” is not alone in calling for such changes. Last November the NATO Parliamentary Assembly passed Resolution 337 with recommendations for enhanced common funding of NATO



Looking to the Future: NATO Training Mission-Iraq

by Rick Lynch and Phillip D. Janzen

“The Alliance has struggled to apply outdated mechanisms and policies to the fluid environment of the out-of-area support mission... The most significant lesson from this mission involves supporting political pronouncements with political will. At the Istanbul Summit, all 26 members committed to support the government of Iraq “with the training of its security forces” and sought further proposals for that support “as a matter of urgency.” This statement soon rang hollow as political consensus was overshadowed by political posturing over involvement in Iraq.”

“With each step, from the reconnaissance mission in July 2004 to the delay in funding for the training institution at Ar Rustamiyah, some countries have capitalized on the Alliance regimen of consensus to block significant advances. Not only has the mission been needlessly delayed by political debate, but these debates consume immense energy and focus from all levels of command. ...

The lesson is that once the political decision is made to commit national treasure and personnel ... for a NATO-led operation, ensuing operational decisions should not be held hostage to the political process. **This may require rethinking the 50-year policy of consensus decision-making. When even the most picayune operational decision requires a 26-member consensus, any nation can block progress on overarching objectives with the wave of a finger.** For example, some Allied nations that stood behind the Istanbul pledge to support Iraq and have contributed to out-of-country support have also in practice politically blocked progress on the main effort of in-country training. The lesson is clear: once the commitment is made and plans are approved, nations must be obligated to support the efforts politically if not materially. ...

The Alliance is well into the transformation process from a static defense organization to a more flexible, deployable mechanism for operations in and out of Europe. The NRF concept and its inherent structures illustrate how NATO is transforming into a more responsive joint and combined force. However, **as the command structure and strategic and operational concepts have rapidly evolved to meet changing threats, financial support mechanisms have not adapted.** For example, the concept of “costs-lay-where-they-fall” restricts participation to countries able to pay, while excluding willing but less financially capable members. This drastically reduces the pool of force contributors while burdening contributors. A related and misunderstood financial concept is NATO common funding. Common funds and nationally borne costs are separate sources. However, in reality, both are paid from the same pool of resources, national defense budgets. In essence, NATO pays both ways -- through common funding or a member’s own purse.

The idea of trust funds to support an operation is also fraught with disaster. Announcing support for an operation plays well in the international arena; however, trust funds allow nations to avoid any financial obligation associated with their verbal pronouncements. A nation can politically support an operation at absolutely no cost to its own treasury. Trust funds also attract an even more complex political dimension: the caveat. Contributing nations can place restrictions and constraints on the use of their contributions, creating an unwieldy system of accounting checks and balances. **NATO should revisit its funding policy**, which penalizes contributing nations by forcing them to pay for their participation. The use of trust funds is also a growing failure. NATO has committed the political capital of the Alliance and all 26 nations represented to train Iraqi officers. It is now prepared to squander that capital by failing to fund the commitment... These are just a few operational issues directly related to funding that highlight what any military thinker will understand. **Without adequate financial resources, and the flexibility to apply those resources at the decisive points in an operation, mission failure becomes a strong possibility.”**



Excerpted from *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 40, May 2006.

Major General Rick Lynch, USA, is deputy chief of staff, Political/Military/Economic, Multi-National Force–Iraq, and was deputy chief of staff for Operations at Joint Forces Command Naples. Lieutenant Colonel Phillip D. Janzen, USA, is Iraq desk officer in the Political Advisor’s Office at Joint Forces Command Naples.

operations.

A third internal adjustments will in fact have to deal with building an Atlantic identity and overcoming the poor image that NATO seems to have in Europe and to a lesser extent in the US. Recently, comparing NATO to the EU, Victoria Nuland acknowledged: “We do a lousy marketing job. Every time a European opens his wallet these days, the euro is staring him in the face.... We need to name our missions NATO... Our soldiers need to wear the NATO patch.... We’ve got to become a 21st-century organization that the population sees as keeping it safer every day.”

2. A Common External Vision

The working area of NATO has changed, for the very nature of the enemies – terrorism, WMD and proliferation – has added a new layer to transatlantic security. More and more, security is becoming a result of coordinated external and domestic action. The enemy is not primarily beyond a particular geographical line, as was the case until 9/11. A working transatlantic community should aim at elaborating in advance, rather than *ex post facto*, a common perspective toward emerging global threats. Solidly based unity of outlook – within the framework of a common transatlantic foreign policy and security strategy, with enough consensus on fundamentals that it is possible for allies to take a relaxed view of day to day differences of opinion – is needed. Developing a common approach to the Middle East and the Islamic world, is high in the list of priorities.

At the same time, almost paradoxically, transatlantic “external relations”, while extending much farther than before, cannot be disentangled from elements of internal security. Internal security is both domestic and collective (among the Atlantic countries combined). A common external vision would have to reflect this new layering.

Does this mean that NATO has to receive a place in the domestic policies against terrorism? Should a common transatlantic homeland security be developed in NATO? Is there a “NATO Homeland”?

Former Spanish Prime Minister Aznar makes the argument (in the report released at the end of 2005,

NATO: An Alliance for Freedom”) that NATO should include homeland security as part of its collective defense role. He suggests that anti-terrorism policy be integrated in NATO, that NATO Council meetings for NATO countries’ ministers of home affairs also be held, and that a ‘counter-terrorism command’ be created.

The notion of a common Transatlantic Homeland Security was first voiced in the fall of 2004 by Tom Ridge, former US Secretary of Homeland Security. Since then the SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations has been steadily exploring the concept of a “NATO Homeland”, and how to “organize our respective efforts at societal protection in a more systematic and coordinated ‘transatlantic’ fashion”. It is pointed out that the invocation of Article 5 after 9/11 created *de facto* a “NATO Homeland” as a space to which we are mutually committed for common defense.

In May 2006, the National Defense University published a special report “Transatlantic Homeland Defense”, proposing that enhanced transatlantic



The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Taro Aso, visits NATO in May 2006. NATO website

homeland defense be a major initiative for adoption at the 2006 Riga Summit and completion at the 2008 summit. The report argues that “As NATO develops its capabilities for expeditionary operations, it needs to revitalize plans and capabilities essential to realize its core mission: protecting Alliance territory as outlined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty... This initiative would offer NATO both a 21st-century approach to Article 5 and new meaning and credibility in the eyes of NATO publics who are concerned

about threats to their homelands.” To implement these measures, according to the report, will require “close coordination and harmonization with national governments, many of which view control of homeland security resources as vital manifestations of their sovereignty.”

3. NATO “Going Global”

For the first time in its history, the Atlantic Alliance is seriously considering expanding not just its activities but its affiliations beyond the Euro-Atlantic region. *The Economist* spoke, in March this year, of a “quiet revolution” leading NATO to go global. De Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General, stated that “NATO should build closer links with democratic nations outside of Europe, such as Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Japan”. Victoria Nuland, US Ambassador to NATO, clarified that “The hope is to see NATO at the core of a global security community”. Former Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar launched last year the idea of full membership for these countries in NATO.

With its new global tasks, it is becoming increasingly necessary to change the way the Alliance is conceived geographically and open its doors to those nations that share Atlantic values and basic socio-political characteristics. Having evolved historically into the same sub-community of the world,

these countries can be reasonably expected to fit in with a common perception of a shared community of destiny and defend one another on grounds of values. This means approximately the OECD countries.

The new multilayered approach adopted by NATO to deal with global threats goes well beyond what Victoria Nuland calls the “the strong, democratic security providers in the world who share our values”. The Alliance is cementing its relations globally with a variety of countries. The new network includes upgraded coordination of efforts with North Africa, the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent (both India and Pakistan), and is set to extend even further. Increasingly we hear that a new network-centric approach is needed to fight new threats. The neologism is of interest and carries some value; however what NATO is moving toward looks more like a concentric system to guarantee global security, or a multilayered unipolar system, with networks supplementing structure, not net-

“NATO goes Global” in multi-tiered fashion



works without structures . If the full set of proposals to reform NATO were to be adopted, the new structure might be contrasted sharply to the first Bush administration's amorphous use of the idea of 'coalitions of the willing' which was widely viewed as dissolving the focus on NATO. However, it would flow with considerable continuity from NATO's 1990s concept mixing the Partnership for Peace (PfP) with Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) to produce NATO-centered coalitions of the willing.

4. NATO-UN and the Atlantic-Global systems

NATO's newly proposed relationship with global security partners, along with current discussions on further enlargement, have been portrayed by some as a threat to the UN and the EU. NATO would develop into a "United Nations of the willing", marginalizing the role of the existing UN. Such perceptions are understandable but mistaken. Despite recent slogans in a few quarters, NATO is not an ephemeral coalition of countries which happen to have convergent views on a few issues, but a security union of countries with deep commonalities. NATO, as a security union of a distinctive sector of the world, has global responsibilities to those members, but it cannot be the sole "guarantor of global security" for them, much less for all the world.


In reality, the multilayered levels of partnership that the Alliance is setting in place resemble a concept that the Atlantic movement had foreseen from its inception, a concept that enhances the global level through complementarity with it, rather than detracting from it. Today, the complexity of new global threats is forcing the Alliance to move toward a more sophisticated form of unity and functions, with the flexibility for multi-tasking, for operating in different environments, and for cooperation not only with national partners around the world but with institutional partners on the global level.

The good news is that there has been an increasing cooperation between the Atlantic level of institutions and the global level. This is a central develop-

ment in international relations. The UN system and the Atlantic system have been rubbing more and more into each other, thanks largely to the nature of the new threats. There is a deeper underlying cause of this trend: in a globalizing and ever more interdependent world, with the industrial democracies playing a major role as security providers, both systems have become increasingly dependent upon each other for their success. The Atlantic system is growing into the role of a core subsystem of the UN system.

In a speech delivered on May 2, Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried tried to clarify the issue, pointing out that while the United States and Europe are "working to make NATO the centerpiece alliance through which the trans-Atlantic democratic community deals with security challenges around the world", NATO is not a "counterweight" to the larger United Nations. The 26-nation NATO alliance has no ambitions for becoming a global organization, but it is "capable and actually, in fact, dealing with global challenges."

Put differently, there are two or three different meanings to "going global". NATO is going global in that its tasks can be anywhere in the world, and its members can come from any corner of the globe, but it is not going global in the sense of accepting all countries into its ranks, nor in the sense that its involvement in global issues is meant to be exclusive or exhaustive. The Atlanticist conception, elaborated already in full force in the 1930s, was that the group



NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer meets with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. [UN website](#)

of Atlantic countries would play a "global role" in more than one sense, and that their core role would assist that of the global institutions within the League of Nations system. Indeed, it was observed that the League of Nations worked, creakingly, on the occasions when the Atlantic allies or ex-allies from World War I agreed, and didn't work at all when they diverged; so it seemed that greater efficiency and cohesion of the Atlantic

grouping was needed, inter alia, for the larger global grouping to succeed.

The degree to which the UN and NATO are actually cooperating would have been unimaginable only

a few years ago and goes well beyond their common engagement in bringing peace and stability to crisis-hit regions. Consultations between NATO and UN specialized bodies now cover a wide range of issues. NATO unlike the Warsaw Pact outlived bipolarity and gradually recovered its memory of the deeper, permanent purposes of Atlantic unity. NATO came to be recognized by the UN as one of its many constructive “regional institutions” in the course of the 1990s, then de facto came to be relied upon by the UN as a uniquely important regional or interregional enforcement institution – even if with considerable delay and reluctance – in the Balkan wars.

Atlantic structures seem to be heading toward a more important role on the UN level, one on which both NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and Secretary General Kofi Annan agreed, speaking of an enhanced NATO-UN cooperation based upon a deeper and more structured relationship. And yet again, as a U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State recently noted, success in this fourth level is interdependent with success in the others. “We believe NATO should do more to assist the United Nations and African Union in Darfur, in accordance with the recent UN Security Council Resolution and a request from the UN Secretary General. NATO’s 2005 humanitarian missions in the Gulf Coast and Pakistan are unlikely to be its last. NATO must have the manpower and means to be as generous and responsive as it can when disaster strikes. It must also reform further to ensure it has the capability and flexibility it needs to meet threats wherever and whenever they arise. NATO activated the NATO Response Force (NRF) for the first time after the earthquake in Pakistan. In the run-up to Riga, our goal is to ensure that the NRF is strengthened, trained, and funded (as well as opened to capable partners) to make sure that it is usable. This process will likely require creative new approaches, including common funding to ensure that the financial burdens of NATO operations are shared more equitably.”

After 9/11 what was at stake was whether the measures adopted by the West were inchoate and transitory, or coherent and enduring; whether they



NATO-UN cooperation: the shape of the future?

were unconvincing and the trans-Atlantic cohesion behind them easily undermined, or convincing and robust; and above all, whether they could galvanize enough forces in the opposition as to induce a new bipolar system, or, on the contrary, whether they would be of a sufficiently open nature as to have good chances of undermining the cohesiveness of any potential oppositional pole. During the war in Afghanistan, the policy was convincing and the global cohesion impressive,

but the structural foundations were undermined rather than nurtured for proceeding together with further steps. The cost was seen in the Iraq war, when the policy itself alienated allies, and its aftermath when trans-Atlantic divisions were mirrored in partial coalescence among oppositional forces. Nevertheless Atlantic cohesion remains as yet greater and deeper than the cohesion of anti-Atlantic or “Atlantic skeptic” forces. Ample space remains for the new stage of Atlantic recovery. The new NATO approaches could help both in overcoming unilateral tendencies and avoiding a new bipolar world. By leaving the door open for new governments to participate in various degrees in common global efforts, they can also provide an incentive toward the spontaneous flourishing of bridges of like-mindedness with individuals and civic society organizations across national borders of hostile regimes. □

— *Dr. Tiziana Stella is Executive Director of the Streit Council*

A Wider Atlantic

further integration of the Greater Middle East and Russia in the framework of Euro-Atlantic Structures

By Lyubomir Ivanov

The aim of this brief comment is not so much to make predictions for the future but rather share some thoughts and hopefully provoke discussion about the ongoing process of change and development brought about by the forces of globalization in the last fifteen-twenty years. While the evolution and transformation of the Euro-Atlantic structures during this period is well known, the prospects for the possible integration of Russia and the Greater Middle East (GME) in both EU and NATO are something new that ought to be examined seriously, and then in the right time frame. Indeed, what seems and is impossible today may be quite possible -- even inevitable -- tomorrow.

A starting point for any such analysis would be the experience of the democratic transformation of CEE. In a few words, this lesson is that no CEE nation regrets its Euro-Atlantic choice, what is regretted is the delays in choice and reforms. An early start brings early results, better wellbeing and lower social price; delays and hesitant reforms result in lost time and paying the high price twice.

Right now one can see the different stages of this process of Euro-Atlantic integration in the case of various CEE countries. Most of them are already in NATO and EU, which, by the way, seemed quite impossible yesterday. The Western Balkans are already scheduled for NATO, and Turkey for EU; that is de-

ecided in principle but the relevant countries are not yet ready, and the process would take several more years. Countries like Ukraine and Georgia are at fairly initial stages, their membership is obviously impossible today but we may already safely presume that it will be quite inevitable tomorrow.

One of the main challenges facing NATO today is the globalization of threats, which entails globalization of the Alliance responsibilities. Naturally, 26 nations cannot simply assume the role of global policeman. That would be neither desirable nor possible. Nevertheless, the 26 increasingly undertake missions in countries like Afghanistan that are remote yet key for the world security. There is a growing demand for NATO services; first, because no comparable security alliance exists or may be expected to appear; and secondly, because today's peace enforcement and peace keeping missions are as a rule multinational, and NATO possesses unique expertise and mechanisms, making the Alliance the best tool for planning, implementing and leading such multinational missions. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that NATO involvement and partnership is increasingly sought in Africa (Darfur) and the Middle East (Gulf countries, training mission in Iraq, possible post-conflict peace keeping in Palestine). One should never forget the lesson of Rwanda, where there was nobody to intervene and stop the genocide, or the lesson of Bosnia, where the delayed intervention made it possible for a full scale civil war to develop resulting in tens of thousands more people killed and hundreds of thousands displaced.

At the same time, the fact is that the 26 have insufficient military capability to back such global responsibilities, despite the progress in national defense

sector reforms, and in NATO transformation. Whether it's a NATO coalition or EU mission, it still draws from the same pool, the combined military capabilities of the 26. This deficit is coupled with the deficit of political credibility to act on behalf of the international community; indeed, it is desirable to have the participation and support of more than 26 nations, preferably mandated by the UN Security Council. This political deficit is further exacerbated by shrinking public support, eroded by vigorous anti-globalist and anti-American propaganda, and hardly opposed by national or Allied public diplomacy effort.

This discrepancy between existing needs and available means is dealt with, at least partially, by way of ongoing NATO enlargement and development of partnerships that help expand the joint capabilities. Let us remember that even early European missions of the Alliance, such as Bosnia and Kosovo, benefited from troop contributions by Russia, Ukraine, other PfP partners, even countries from Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. On the agenda is the development of PfP-like partnerships in the South Mediterranean and the Greater Middle East, building upon the NATO Mediterranean dialogue, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, Gulf Cooperation Council partnership, and even the establishment of global partnerships with Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.

While NATO has no decision or declared intention at this stage of inviting any such global partners to join the Alliance, partnerships could naturally pave the way to membership, especially having in mind that countries like Japan or Australia could easily meet the membership criteria, certainly in much less time than CEE has needed.

When we assess the place of Russia vis-a-vis NATO, that country obviously has the capabilities for a substantial and valuable contribution to NATO-led missions. This has already been demonstrated in Bosnia and Kosovo. Russia also has the advantage of an institutionalized partnership by way of the NATO-Russia Council. That framework could be enhanced but nevertheless falls short of

membership, as it does not provide Russia with a say in NATO's decision making. Russian membership in NATO is presently out of the question. It is certainly unrealistic today. The idea of some Russian analysts that the Alliance missed an opportunity to invite Russia in the 1990s is based on a serious lack of understanding of the nature of NATO and its enlargement process. Such an invitation was quite impossible as Russia was not ready for NATO membership in the 1990s. Russia is not ready today either, and it is an axiom that no country may join the Alliance unless it meets NATO standards. Furthermore, unlike Ukraine or Georgia, Russia has not even decided to join NATO. However, I expect such a decision on the Russian side sooner rather than later, and the progress of Ukraine on the road to NATO would have a major impact on the evolution of Russia's intentions. After that, it would be a matter of having the relevant reforms done and criteria met, relying of course on the Alliance guidance and support.

The more diverse region of GME is likely to follow several individual models of democratic transformation and integration with NATO, very much like the diversity of CEE, where certain countries started as producers of security from the very beginning, while others underwent the whole road of a country in military conflict becoming the

subject of an Allied mission and internationally supported nation building, and eventually joining NATO. There is no doubt, however, that like in the case of CEE, NATO and NATO integration is to play a crucial role in both national and regional democratic development.

In the epoch of globalization, the logic of EU-style integration apparently dictates that each country should seek participation in some similar project of regional integration. Speaking of Russia and the GME, it is quite obvious that for geographical, historical and economic reasons, their natural integration partners would be the other republics of the former Soviet Union, the East European countries, and the South European countries in the first place, and the rest of the West European countries in the sec-



Dr. Ivanov (right) meets with Jabar Manda, Deputy Minister of Defense of Iraqi Kurdistan. Atlantic Club of Bulgaria

ond place. And immediately the problem is that most of these potential integration partners are already in the EU or on their way to join. So the question is, where will Russia and the GME integrate?

It is unrealistic for Russia or the GME to form their own integration centers separately from EU, as they lack the necessary human, political and economic potential for that. Having no partners left for such projects either, both Russia and the GME face no alternative but to join the EU itself. This idea might seem bizarre and grossly unrealistic; indeed, the EU accession is a much more sophisticated process, much more difficult to achieve than NATO membership. It is also true that presently there is very little enthusiasm in EU to think about further enlargements after Turkey and Ukraine. Still, most of what is reality today seemed equally unrealistic fifteen years ago, and the pace of world change, if anything, is accelerating. After all, if Turkey could progress towards EU accession, why not Morocco or Russia? Does anyone believe that the natural permanent border of EU might be that between Kiev and Moscow?

While the NATO enlargement process goes in parallel with (and generally preceding and facilitating) EU enlargement in Eurasia and potentially Africa, in other world regions it would probably have to have other economic and political integration companions. In Latin America for instance, the Atlantic integration of countries like Mexico or Chile may benefit from their US-sponsored NAFTA/AFTA integration. □

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“Most of what is reality today seemed equally unrealistic fifteen years ago, and the pace of world change, if anything, is accelerating.



АТЛАНТИЧЕСКИЯТ КЛУБ В БЪЛГАРИЯ

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... We ask your support in order to establish a Kurdistan Atlantic Club to support your cause and principles in Kurdistan, Iraq and the Middle East. For that reason, we will present an official application to the Atlantic Clubs Society through the Bulgarian Atlantic Club.

Jabar Y. Manda

Deputy Minister of Defense of Iraqi Kurdistan

April 4, 2006, Sofia, Bulgaria,

On occasion of the celebration of the 15th anniversary of the organized Atlantic movement in Central and Eastern Europe.



What is the G8, and should Russia be kept in it?

By Ira Straus

The current debate over Russia in the G8 has had plenty of fireworks, but it has been based to a large extent on misconceptions about the G8. There is an apparent lack of memory, both of what the G8 is and of what Russia's role in it has been.

For those of us who are unhappy with the current trend of Russian politics, it is tempting to look for a way to punish Russia and seize upon the G8 as a high-visibility place to do it. But this issue is about the G8 and Western interests, not just about Russia.

Too much of the debate has been solely about Russia, and about emotional aspects of the Russian question at that. The debaters have known far less about the G8 than about Russia. This is not surprising: international institutions are relatively little understood entities compared to national states. This is particularly true of the Atlantic-based institutions like the G8.

Misconceptions about the G8 abound, and they start at the very beginning: with a false characterization of the G7. The group is often described as a "club of the major democracies". This is plainly mistaken: India has always been a major democracy but has never been included. A competing mischaracterization is to call it a grouping of "the main economic powers of the world"; if that were the case, the Soviet Union and China would have always been in it.

Such characterizations have led to a widespread proposal for adding China and India to make a G-10.

This shows the danger of a false characterization, even if it sounds idealistic and good for PR at first hearing: it leads to conclusions that would undermine the core usefulness of the actual G8.

What the G7/G8 Is

In reality, the G7 always consisted, not of all major democracies, nor of all economic powers, but of the specifically Western and Westernized democratic powers. These were the powers that were already joined institutionally in the Atlantic system of institutions – NATO, OECD, IEA, COCOM, and other related structures. The G7 was, accordingly, a part of the Atlantic system. It constituted an informal executive committee of the Atlantic system.

Russia's gradual inclusion in the 1990s fit in with this reality. Russia was brought in as a great power that belongs broadly to the Western (European or Christian heritage) civilization, one that was always a member of the Concert of Europe. It was the same reason why NATO in 1994 declared itself open to eventual membership for Russia and all post-Soviet OSCE countries. The West did not consider Russia ripe for NATO membership yet; the G7 was considered a more appropriate venue for it at that stage. Even that was far from a perfect "fit", since Russia was far from being a full democracy. But it was a much better fit than is implied when G7 is depicted in undifferentiated globalistic democratic language.

The most skillful G7 proponents have advocated that the Group be reinforced institutionally as an organizing core for a powerfully structured Community of the Atlantic and Pacific basin democracies. The Community would be formed by drawing to-

gether all the Atlantic institutions into a unified structure with a common identity, with the G7 as its focal point. This was the goal of James R. Huntley, founder of the Committee (now Council) for a Community of Democracies (CCD).

To date, this grand scheme has yet to materialize. CCD was not able to raise money to advance its goal, a Community of the Western Democracies. It did however find NED funding for the wider but thinner project of an association of all the world's democracies. Madeleine Albright took up this project and put it into practice, creating the very loose international grouping that is today called "the Community of Democracies" – a name that can be a source of confusion since CCD had something much thicker in mind for a "community" of Western democracies. Meanwhile the G7 has had to look elsewhere for upgrading its élan.

How Russia G-8 membership has served vital Western interests

In the '90s, the G7 got enhanced attention by putting Russia on its platter as a great power to assimilate. This served to focus enormous public attention on the G7, such as might be envied by the other Atlantic institutions. It also gave the G7 a project – helping with the economic and political reform of Russia – around which to build some institutional membranes, and a focus for keeping up its energies during the placid moments of the 1990s.

It has also been a basis for important practical steps in cooperation with Russia. Rose Gottemoeller, non-proliferation director in the Clinton Administration, has pointed out that the G8 played an essential role in launching and gradually developing nuclear cooperation projects with Russia. These projects have contributed, quietly, to a profound improvement in the nuclear security situation.

Russia's G8 standing was also extremely useful for the West during the Kosovo war of 1999, when the half-integration of Russia with the West was at risk of unraveling completely. Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin were able to come back from behind politically and salvage the relation, but only barely, and thanks to the continued connective links maintained all along through the G8. It was the G8 that served as the venue where Russia could sit as an equal and reach with some dignity a common policy with the West

on Kosovo. Without Russia's help in getting Serbia to fold, NATO probably would have had to go into a ground war against the Serbs. This would have been extremely divisive: the allies were very reluctant to put forces on the ground. The heavy casualties and stories of the moral ambiguity of the war would have put NATO itself at risk of unraveling as an alliance and an institution. It was Russia, through the G8, that got NATO out of the hole.

We should ask whether we would really prefer now if Russia had never been in the G8 and we had ended up stuck in a Kosovo ground war. Would it have been better to put NATO at risk of falling apart, for the sake of keeping a sense of virginal purity in its sister institution, the G8?

We will probably need Russia's help again. After September 11, 2001 we needed it for the war in Afghanistan. We continue to need its oil and gas, even as we are worried about dependence on it. We needed Russia in both world wars; we needed Russia's European soul for getting us peacefully out of the Cold War; we will continue to need Russia in the sequel to the series of world wars – the global war with Islamist extremism and terrorism. These are vital, survival interests. Can we afford to undermine the political and diplomatic basis for proceeding with them, by kicking Russia out of the G8? In principle, we need to develop that basis further: we need more of Russia than we have got of it, so to speak. But political circumstances are not propitious.

How Russia in the G8 also creates problems for the West

Despite the importance of having Russia in the G8 today, there is a price paid for it. At the G8 one is ideally supposed to focus on the common interest, shunting to the side the traditional role of threats or implied threats in negotiations. No Western power does this perfectly; Russia less so. Russia sees itself as having a number of interests in opposition to the West, to be dealt with by power-politics bargaining, i.e. implied threat, habitual resistance to Western positions for the sake of bargaining chips, and using its energy power to maneuver Western countries into separate deals with it. This makes it harder for the West to upgrade its common interest at G8 meetings.

Russia has often seen its first interest in the G8 as

one of maintaining its own status there and perfecting its claim to full membership, rather than enhancing the status and solidarity of the G8 as a whole. Nevertheless, the latter, G8 strengthening purpose is one that the Russian elite, when it was in a more idealistic mood in 2001-2, gave impressive evidence of sharing; indeed, it spoke of it more than is usual among Western elites.

As the rotating G8 president this year, Russia has conducted itself well in preparing the agenda of the G8. It set forth a series of themes relevant to G8 development as an institutional group. In this, it has done better than some previous G8 presidencies.

Russia has highlighted energy security, internationally infectious diseases, and education for adaptation to globalization. These are central G8 concerns.

It would have been a laudable and successful debut for Russia as G8 president – except for one nagging fact: Russia

started off its year as president with a “gas war” with Ukraine. This underlined the fact that Russia is not just an ally of the West vis-a-vis the geopolitical use of oil by Islamic regimes; it is also sometimes itself an adversary in its own geopolitical use of oil and gas. This adversarial aspect will continue as long as Russia and the West have substantial divergences in geopolitical concepts.

And the divergences remain large. The dismal fact is that Russia and the West have delayed persistently on the need, obvious ever since 1991, of eliminating their opposing Cold War strategic concepts and replacing them – along with the interconnected systems of force structures, geopolitical clienteles, and planning and decision channels – with an integrated, compatible concept and system. This failure has been seen both on the nuclear and conventional (NATO) levels, where the two sides have only continued to pare down the differences by detente (reduction of separate forces) rather than to build an entente (a

part-integrated system for pursuit of shared objectives). Locked by default into conflicting strategies, they naturally apply their resources – including oil and gas resources – to tip “their side” of the scale.

It is also a fact of nature that Russia, as an energy exporter, has opposite energy pricing interests than the other, energy importing G7 and OECD countries. This makes it more difficult, although also more important, for the West to keep Russia on “its side” and avert an anti-Western alliance of oil and gas powers. Better for the different interests on prices and supplies to be traded off within the G8 hut as friends rather than have Russia go outside the hut into an

OPEC huddle. Such trade-offs of huge interest are never easy even while staying friends, but they are not impossible, as Norway for example has shown. The space for bargains, though tight, has not disappeared: Russia still needs its Western consumers, the West still needs Russian oil, and the Russian elite is still oriented to the West as its natural home.


While the cumulative trend since 1985 has been for Russia

to adapt to the Western world order, and Russia has come a tremendous distance – taking enormous and costly strides toward the West, against which the Western attempts to accommodate Russia look tiny by comparison – nevertheless there have been a number of unnerving ups and downs and threats of reversal. The downturn of the last couple years has actually been less sharp than most of the earlier ones, although it has continued for a longer time.

During each of the downturns, there were calls just as loud and widespread as those of today for giving up on Russia. We need to realize the price we would have paid had we heeded them.

What To Do with Russia?

In this very mixed situation, what is to be done? Expulsion or suspension of Russia from the G8 would be counterproductive. The calls for this have been a matter of grandstanding and media feeding.



A more modest proposal, advanced in a Council on Foreign Relations report on *Russia's Wrong Direction*, is to revive the G7 alongside the G8. This need not be greatly at the expense of the G8: the latter would still serve an important function, in parallel with the G7 functions as executive committee for the NATO-OECD system. Some elements of a renewed G7 are already being implemented quietly, and a financial G7 has always continued to exist alongside the G8. Announcement of a formal G7 reconstitution, however, would be premature. Russia's G8 presidency this year is already in process, and is not seriously harming the Group. After the year ends, the G8 will go back to meeting under Western presidencies for a number of years to come.



Long before there is another Russian G8 presidency, Russia will have held its domestic presidential elections in 2008. Much of the negative turn in Russia has flowed from Putin's preparations for controlling the results of this electoral process.

It can hardly be overstated how important it is for the West that the restructured Russian leadership after 2008 should come primarily from the more Western-oriented side of the Putin administration, not the anti-Western side; that, in the period when Putin is deciding who to support as his successor, he should continue to identify more with the West than against it; and that, in its formative period, the reconfigured regime should define its identity along Western lines and feel itself as belonging to the West and having a home there. For this purpose, exclusion would be counter-productive; continued constructive engagement is the better option, unsatisfying though it may be emotionally at this time. Russia is not Iran: it is not a regime far off the deep end, with which engagement always feels like appeasement, rather it is a country that Westerners are disappointed with, but that has itself been conducting large-scale appeasement of the West in recent years.

Russia is also not China, which has been treated much better than Russia and let into the WTO ear-

lier, despite remaining a party-state under the Communist Party and a predatory trader. If Russia in its present conditions comes to be treated still worse, the double standard will be obvious – it is already widely

commented on in Russia – and will lead to counterproductive conclusions about how to get good treatment from the West.

If Russia had been deeply integrated with the West in the 1990s, through, say, NATO and IEA as well as the G8, it would make sense to ask whether there are some cautious steps back that could be appropriately taken in our institutionalized relations in this period. But it has not been deeply integrated and there is virtually no flex space for stepping back at this time. That is

why the debate boils down in practice to how can the West continue to advance the constructive engagement of Russia despite the unpropitious atmosphere, and how much should it quietly renew autonomous G7 channels at the same time.

“The G7 always consisted, not of all major democracies, nor of all economic powers, but of the specifically Western and Westernized democratic powers ... The G7 was, accordingly, a part of the Atlantic system. It constituted an informal executive committee of the Atlantic system.”

What to do with the Atlantic institutions?

Looking more broadly at the Atlantic system, the question boils down to this: how can the Atlantic institutions be further developed in the meanwhile, if relations with Russia are stalled? Can the Alliance complete the assimilation of its Pacific wing – Japan, Australia, New Zealand – into the NATO core? Can it develop its new partnerships in every region of the world, focused on new tasks and enemies? Can it adapt its institutions and its work more effectively to these new tasks of facing a new enemy, and one of a new kind? All of this is underway, although not on an adequately transformative scale.

If NATO and the other Atlantic institutions do all this, and on an adequate scale, they may finally move almost completely outside of the psychological orbit of the Cold War – the orbit within which many Russians and Westerners alike have continued to perceive NATO and Atlanticism. This mental association has been the largest single factor inhibiting mutual assimilation of Russia and NATO in the years

since 1991. It may take another cycle of history, in which there is less focus on Russia, to overcome it.

Waiting for another cycle of history is an easy answer; too easy, for it entails uncontrollable risks. A cycle of delay could degenerate at any time into conflict. There is a precedent: it took two cycles before the Atlantic Allies got it right with Germany, and the second cycle brought an even deadlier world war than the first.

There might be greater cause for optimism if the official Atlanticist milieu were still imbued with the federative spirit of the founders of NATO, seeking out, e.g., every practical step for bringing the Atlantic into a deep enough political union that the military side of Atlanticism would no longer overshadow the political side. In that case, transformation might go far enough to complete the cycle before new crises arise. At best, however, one can say only that some elements of that spirit have been recovered in recent years.

It will be hard to freeze the present half-way relationship with Russia and refocus elsewhere for any lengthy time; too many problems will keep dragging the two sides back into trouble. If the Russia-G8 issue gets a rest, Russia-NATO issues may soon come to the fore. The push for Ukrainian membership in NATO in 2008 would likely bring a new crisis in Russia-West relations. This would be piled atop the present negative turn in Russia, which was already sharply exacerbated by the Ukrainian election battle of 2004. One never knows when one gets to the straw that breaks the camel's back.

To be sure, Ukrainian entry in NATO could be turned into a neutral or even positive factor if the NATO-Russia structures were strengthened at the same time. This was the solution found in the two previous rounds of NATO expansion: the NATO-Russia Council was formed in 1997 and upgraded in 2002, and it served greatly to soften the blow in each case. However, in the present period of mutual disillusion, a further upgrading is less likely, a crisis in relations more likely.

If matters are nevertheless kept on an even keel – if the issue of Russia in the G8 is left to rest after this year, if NATO either defers Ukrainian membership or balances it with enhanced relations with Russia as in the previous rounds of expansion, if meanwhile NATO focuses primarily on adapting to the global

struggle with terrorism, and on transforming itself and expanding its reach to the Pacific allies and to partnerships elsewhere in the world, if the Cold War configuration of NATO versus Russia finally fades out of NATO's consciousness of itself and Russia's consciousness of NATO – then the prospects after the 2008 Russian elections may not be so bad after all.

These are big “ifs”. If they come to pass, they will give the West a respite: a period of half a dozen years after 2008 to evaluate the results of the leadership changes in Russia, before Russia would again hold the rotating leadership of the G8. If Russian then continues to go in a negative direction, the time may arrive for formally reconstituting a G7, or even for suspending Russia from the G8. But it is no less possible that Russia's underlying trend since 1985 – adaptation to Western global leadership – will regain predominance. In that case, there will be another opportunity for integration of Russia into the West. It will be important for the West to be prepared for it this time, as it was not in 1991 or the years after.

If Russia were thus to come back the westward way, the negative turn in 2004-6 would look in retrospect like another of the many blips that have floated across the screen – floated very worrisomely, and then dissipated – in the course of the long process of Russia's transformation. It is a process that has taken Russia far away from its starting point as a Communist superpower at the center of an alternative world system; it may yet deposit it into the position of a contributing great power within the Western world system. □

Dr. Ira Straus is U.S. coordinator of the Committee on Eastern Europe and Russia in NATO. He is not part of the Streit Council. He was Executive Director of the Association to Unite the Democracies from 1985 to 1991.

How Federal Union Affected my Career

By
James R.
Huntley



“**W**hen Strausz-Hupé, in *The Zone of Indifference*, alluded to Clarence Streit’s works, this struck a distant chord: in high school, in the autumn of 1940, I had debated the thesis of Streit’s current book of that time, viz. that the United States and Britain should form a federal union. Streit’s [broader] work urged that the Europeans, the Canadians, the Americans, plus the Australians and New Zealanders, should without delay form a federal union. Streit influenced many important people of his day, including John Foster Dulles [. . .] I was to meet Streit in 1955 and Strausz-Hupé in 1956, to become and intimate friend of both, and to deepen my understanding of this great concept...and also, later, to become convinced of how extremely difficult it would be to bring it about. But it has always been a grand, noble plan to which I have attached my life.” (*An Architect of Democracy...* p. 45)

The story starts in 1940. I was a 16 year old high school senior in my home state of Washington. In those days, most high schools around the nation participated in an annual round of "debates", to help us learn about public life and hone our speaking skills. I was on our team, and in the fall of 1940, we were required to debate this question: "Should the United States form a federal union with Great Britain?" I read some, if not all, of Clarence K. Streit's revised edition, arguing cogently for this Union. It was an interesting idea. I liked it. The publisher of

Time and Life magazines, Henry Luce, backed Streit and his ideas; soon there were chapters of Streit’s opinion-rallying organization, Federal Union, all over the United States.

But the next year, when I had just started university, along came Pearl Harbor. In the turmoil of those years, plus a couple in the U.S. Navy for me, I quite forgot about Streit's message. In 1946, back at the university, I became marginally involved with the World Federalists. A trip to Europe in 1948, plus the effort of a new job in state government and the beginnings of a family, caused me to forget about Atlantic or World federalism; I couldn't imagine how to help the European peoples think big thoughts when their nations had been so terribly damaged. Suddenly, in the summer of 1950, the Korean War started. I decided to go into international work to try to help the world deal with an obvious set of crises looming; trying to help improve domestic conditions in the U.S. now seemed less important to me than to find some way to help the world find a way forward. Some graduate work led to an offer from the Department of State to go to Germany, at the beginning of 1952, to help the Germans rebuild democracy and rejoin the international community. I was in Germany for four years, learned a great deal, and loved my work. (Today, I think any fair-minded person can say that the Germans have wonderfully rehabilitated their country, and that we Americans also played an important role.)

While a young diplomat in Germany, I became convinced that it was imperative for Germany (and the rest of Western Europe) to join the proposed European community (now Union) and also to become part of the new NATO. But I didn't see exactly how these European and Atlantic ventures added up, in terms of American involvement.

A friend gave me a copy of a fine book by Robert Strausz-Hupé, *The Zone of Indifference*, a volume more philosophical, visionary, and historical in content than his later important works on the Cold War. He wrote about Clarence Streit's idea of an Atlantic federal union, and suggested that this was the way to go. Later, on my return from four years in Germany, I met Clarence and began a long friendship and intellectual give and take which only ended with his sad death years later. Clarence flattered me, asking if I'd like to be his executive director in the movement. I said no, rather reluctantly, and stayed in the Foreign Service six more years, then went on to many other tasks in Europe and in the United States. But from 1955 and onward, I have known that Clarence's formula is the right one long-term, and I have never ceased doing what I can to promote the idea, and work towards it in my own way.

Later, when I left the diplomatic service, I became a Board Member of Federal Union. When I wrote a book called *Uniting the Democracies* (1980), several fellow Board members decided they wanted to change Federal Union's name to "Association to Unite the Democracies", I suppose because I had suggested that that process was going to be a long and very involved one. The change, incidentally, was never my idea; in fact I thought it was a mistake.

I tried in those days to chart out for myself, and perhaps for others, the things that would have to be done to cultivate a sufficient degree of "likemindedness" among Americans, Canadians, and Europeans to get them to entertain such a vast idea as a common federal union.

I have always been convinced that we would need a sociological transformation in thought and behavior for Americans (and now, Europeans and Canadians and others, too) to make a federal union of democracies a viable political concept. Therefore I spent many years, in various capacities, trying to hone three related ideas: (1) an appealing, flexible concept that would attract sensible leaders of thought and civic enterprises; (2) creation of a series of international institutions that would gradually unite the core democracies of the West and then others; and (3) the development of a multinational leadership group to educate people and to run the integrating institutions as they became denser and more and more supranational.

Still later, in the 1980s, I became involved in more career changes. I became disappointed with the federal union movement at one stage, perhaps because I couldn't see it progressing much



From left to right: Erik Johnson, Tiziana Stella, James Huntley, Colleen Huntley

From:
***An Architect of Democracy:
Building a Mosaic of Peace***

“I was tremendously impressed with Streit and his federal recipe for the Atlantic democracies, and we maintained a cordial tie until his death in 1986.” p. 109

“Streit’s great idea animated many initiatives with more than just a whiff of “federal union.” NATO was one; the continental European Union – coupled with the idea of an Atlantic Partnership – was another.” p. 425

further at the time and because I felt I had to call my shots carefully. (This happens to most people, I think, as they grow older.)

Well, the rest of the story is too long to tell here, but suffice to say I never lost sight of a federal union of the mature democracies, as the core for a larger union as more and more countries evolved towards free and stable systems of government. Several friends, some inside and some outside the Federal Union circle, shared this dream. We started a series of corresponding committees around the world from 1979 to 1991, the Committees for a Community of Democracies (CCD), to explore these ideas together. For several years beginning in 1991, AUD provided our main base of operations. In 2000, a few of us set up today's "Council for a Community of Democracies". Our scheme was to strengthen the links between the experienced democracies pragmatically, and then to bring more and more democratic peoples around the world, to work together on common problems and dangers, and to strengthen their own practices of democratic government.


At Warsaw in the summer of 2000, a large meeting of 106 democratic governments and NGOs, inspired by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and her Polish counterpart, met in Warsaw and formed a loose "Community of Democracies." The present

NGO, CCD, helps this idea along, watching all the time for ways to strengthen the core of the movement, to attract more members, and to reach out to those countries that need encouragement. Fortunately, there are now a number of NGOs, in the United States and elsewhere, that are helping to strengthen democratic institutions and behavior around the world. Our CCD concentrates on the links among these nations, and their common interests, and is virtually unique in doing so. However, I think we at CCD have a good deal in common with the Streit Council, which concentrates on the long-range, grand scheme that began with Clarence and his bold new ideas in the Thirties. His principles on Atlantic federal unity were far in advance of political leaders of the day but nevertheless have already been incorporated in some of the most powerful international institutions, such as NATO.

Good luck and good sailing to the Streit Council!



On June 14, at DACOR Bacon House, Washington, DC, Jim Huntley celebrated the publication of his autobiography with a book signing.



AN ARCHITECT OF DEMOCRACY: Building a Mosaic of Peace

By *James Robert Huntley*

Foreword by Brent Scowcroft

(ADST Memoirs and Occasional Papers Series, from New Academia Publishing, 2006)

A detailed chronicle of the working life of an idealistic, action-oriented World War II veteran's lifelong search for peace through strengthening democracies and the international institutions that unite them.

Session on Atlanticism

at convention of Historians of US Foreign Policy

Report of the Streit Council Panel
at the Annual Meeting of the Society of
Historians of American Foreign Relations

Overview: The Streit Council organized a highly successful panel on Atlanticism at the annual convention of the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations. Papers were given by Streit Council Board members **Don Dennis** and **Richard Arndt** and past AUD Executive Director **Ira Straus**. **Donald Jensen** of Radio Free Europe, who is also on the SC Board, chaired the panel.

The panel, initiated by SC Executive Director **Tiziana Stella**, was brought together around a theme that took off from the “soft power versus hard power” alternatives offered by Robert Kagan in his argument that Europeans are from Venus and Americans from Mars. Competing with other panels of SHAFR, a large audience was attracted to the SC panel on Atlanticism.

The panel addressed the “hard power-soft power” question by asking what could be learned from earlier American foreign policies about how to manage this seeming antitheses. It found that the federalist and Atlanticist approaches had been able by stages to join the two ends of this polarity and overcome their opposition in the course of much of the 20th century.

A broader goal of the panel was to foster discussion among historians on why the Atlanticist post-1945 strategy of integrating an initial group of democratic countries succeeded in attracting other countries to democratize and join, contrary to the view that much of the academic and activist worlds had long taken that it would only cause other countries to unite against it. The panelists argued that the Atlanticist approach had combined universalism with regionalism in two ways: the “nucleus” strategy of moving from the regional toward the universal by attracting

others to join, and the concentric circles approach favoring both inner (Atlantic) and outer (global) layers of international organization, with the inner circle providing leadership and dynamism, the outer circle providing global legal norms and legitimacy.


The sophistication of this approach emerged out of the traumatic experiences of the World War I and II generations. The internationalists of the time became well aware of the inadequacy of every simplistic form of internationalism and, through several stages, from the League of Free Nations Association to Clarence Streit, developed a more sophisticated one. After 1947 they were able to implement, in a partial, Euro-Atlantic form, their dual strategy -- concentric circles and open nucleus -- raising their conception to the level of the core project of American policy.

They were not, however, able to perpetuate an understanding of their approach in subsequent generations and in historiography. This was one of their weaknesses. Still, their approach remains structurally in existence, in the form of institutional arrangements that were built as works-in-progress. Thus the panelists held that, despite the gap in memory, the idea of an open union of democracies should continue to be counted as the central project of 20th century American foreign policy.

It could be argued that the panel, despite its strict focus on history, posed by implication a challenge to contemporary policymakers: to understand the Atlanticist project they have received and to decide whether and how to continue it in a cumulative way.

Synopsis of the papers

Don Dennis, Vice President of the Foreign Policy Association for half a century and author of *Foreign Policy in a Democracy* (2003) – the only book yet published on the League of Free Nations Association (LFNA) and its successor organization, the Foreign Policy Association.



Dennis focused on the initial efforts made by private citizens' group to influence policymakers in the direction of a union of liberal democracies during World War I. President Wilson himself, though dedicated to universalism, had in 1917 championed the idea of a League of Democratic Powers. It was through the work of the LFNA that the idea first took the form of political planning. It answered the concerns of those who, though skeptical about the viability of universalism in their time, still felt a universal moral responsibility. The idea that the democracies could perform such a moral obligation better than others seemed to provide a logical pathway out of the tension between universalistic goals and pragmatic reliable means.

The LFNA was the most far-reaching of the proposals for institutionalizing instead of dissolving the WWI Atlantic alliance.

Many of those who had supported the LFNA program would become supporter of the WWII idea of a federal union of democracies as proposed by Clarence Streit. The idea continued to be influential. It spawned a political action group, the Atlantic Union Committee, that had a significant impact in obtaining U.S. participation in NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in 1949. It was instrumental in NATO's sponsorship of the Atlantic Congress held in London in 1959, with 600 leaders of the NATO countries meeting to seek closer integration of the Atlantic Community. Dennis concluded with the comment that "sixty-five years after Streit submitted his proposal his vision is alive and active, backed by the Streit Council for a Union of Democracies located in Washington, DC."

Richard Arndt, former Foreign Service Officer and author of *First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century* (2005).

Arndt discussed postwar US cultural diplomacy as a tool of American soft power in the context of a broadly Atlanticist form of internationalism. His paper focused on how the cultural diplomatic idea designed by Welles, MacLeish, Fulbright and dozens of others,

articulated, formalized and built on nearly two centuries of enlightened private activity. Their work translated into practice the cultural aspect of the WWI and WWII generations' internationalist vision. "In 1945 – Arndt stated – the Atlanticist vision was firmly in place (...). Fulbright, comfortably established in the Senate, was looking for a way to democratize the Rhodes experience, which had refocused his life. And MacLeish was in charge of cultural diplomacy, defined as broadly as he liked. (...) These visionaries spelled out a cultural internationalist Atlanticist vision, designed to help Europe rebuild, then to provide an extendable area of cooperative prosperity for which educational linkage and organic growth would slowly put in place a global infrastructure. The goal: a cumulative process aimed at embracing all other countries, as they achieved the political, economic and educational maturity to play their role in a global system. Its implicit and explicit rhetoric projected the slow but natural growth of freedom, democracy, respect for human rights, prosperity and, in time, peace."

Ira Straus, U.S. coordinator of the Committee on Eastern Europe and Russia in NATO.

Straus recalled that supranational integration of the Atlantic area had emerged as a focus of thinking among intellectuals on both sides of the Atlantic already in the second half of the 19th century. They developed an approach coupling soft and hard power and intertwining them in a number of ways. The idea of an attractive "nucleus" union was the greatest soft power element; the empirical fact of the hegemonic global strength such a union would hold meanwhile was the hard power element. This approach was gradually implemented in practice, never completely but reaching far enough to test its major elements, beginning with the Anglo-American rapprochement of the 1890s and continuing with the Atlantic alliances of the two world wars and their institutionalization during the Cold War in multiple forms, economic (OECD and G-7) as well as military (NATO). In the long debate between Atlanticism and its critics, the main argument was whether deep and formal Atlantic integration would

*Neither Venus nor Mars:
The Mix of Hard and Soft Power and the Successes
of US Atlanticist Strategy in the 20th Century*

U.S. National Archives and Records building
College Park, Maryland

Chair: Donald Jensen, Director of Communications, Radio Free Europe

Panelists and Papers:

Don Dennis, *The League of Free Nations Association: The First Organized Attempt to Move Policy Toward a Union of Democracies.*

Richard Arndt, *Sources and Concept of Postwar Cultural Diplomacy.*

Ira Straus, *The Atlanticist Establishment and its Successful Strategy after the 1890s.*

Commentator: Richard C. Rowson, President, Council for a Community of Democracies

serve to attract those still outside to seek to join, as Atlanticists argued, or alienate the others and drive them into opposite alliances. The latter view was widely held by nearly all other academic and political schools -- realists, neutralists, pacifists, nationalists, globalists... They all cited the Warsaw Pact as the proof of their views, treating it as the inevitable realpolitik counterpart of NATO which was seen as merely one wing of a bipolar world system. However, they were shown to be mistaken when the Soviet empire collapsed, leaving a concentric unipolar system in which the successor regimes all sought entry into NATO and the other trans-Atlantic institutions. The Atlanticist approach of an "open nucleus of attraction" proved more successful than in the wildest dreams of most of its proponents.

At present, there is still important unfinished business in the integration of Eastern Europe and Russia into the West; meanwhile major new strategic challenges have arisen in the non-European world. Straus asked whether the Atlanticist approach is relevant to them. He held that the role of Atlantic leadership remains central in managing problems in the Middle East, but full-fledged optimistic solutions such as democratization and integration into the Atlantic institutions seem farther afield there than in Europe. The Bulgarian Atlantic Club has proposed the optimistic approach, taking the "soft" side of the Atlanticist strategem -- spreading democracy and integrating democracies -- now that it has succeeded in Europe, and extending it in stages into the Middle East. Straus concluded that "it remains to be seriously examined whether this is feasible, or whether the 'hard' side of the Atlanticist strategem -- an efficiently organized hegemony of the existing Atlantic group -- is instead more relevant for a long interim period; and further, to examine how the two sides can be combined into a coherent, realistically sequenced strategy for the non-European world as it was in the 20th century for the European."

Tiziana Stella, Streit Council Executive Director.

In addition to organizing the SC panel, Stella, at a separate panel of the convention, presented a paper on "Betrayal or Recovery of American Ideas? Federal Union and the Formative Moment of Postwar US Diplo-

macy". She described the emergence in 1939 of the Federal Union movement as "the first transatlantic transnational movement to attempt coordination between transatlantic elites and transatlantic popular mobilization", and discussed its impact on US diplomacy during and after WWII.

Preceding US entry in WWII, in the battle between isolationists and internationalists, the very nature of American identity, the meaning of the Revolution and the Constitution, was at stake. The intensity of this fierce debate polarized the country. In order to come out of its cul de sac at the end of one wing of this polarization, it forced American internationalists -- faced with the charge of betrayal and treason -- to search its soul and recover from within the American experience a set of principles and a political tradition to underpin a dif-



From left to right: Ira Straus, Don Dennis, Tiziana Stella, Richard Rowson, Donald Jensen, Richard Arndt

ferent and deeper internationalism. This contributed in winning public opinion support for intervention in WWII and went on to permeate postwar US diplomacy. Federal Union embodied the strand of American thinking that sustained the sentiment of federal democratic unification expressed in the American constitutional experiment of 1787 and transposed it upward to the international level.

If Federal Union reached an influence so disproportionate to its size, it was also thanks its strategy of involving the multiple sectors of the incipient transatlantic society. Beyond the support of some of the leading press and of the public at large, the transnational and permanent (that is, not contingent on wartime) nature of the Federal Union goals provided a template for postwar planning, which was well underway at the diplomatic level at an early moment, even before the US joined the conflict.

Thanks to this movement, American internationalism, when finally able to triumph, took a refurbished form that went beyond mere internationalism to incorporate elements of supranationalism, spawning a postwar system of Euro-Atlantic institutions that linked the United States closely with the other industrial democracies. □

The Streit Council, Our Fellows' Perspective

By Nueteki Akuetteh

I was first attracted to the Streit Council for a Union of Democracies because its mission to provide closer cooperation among experienced democracies synchronized with my current thesis research on transatlantic security cooperation. Yet, despite having researched transatlantic security cooperation extensively, the Council challenged me to think of Atlanticism in a broader context. Moreover, I came to the deeper realization that much of international relations relies too heavily upon myopic ideas of national sovereignties and interests, and not, as do members of the Streit Council, on steps toward transcendence of these notions. Given the contemporary landscape it is my firm belief that this elevated cooperation must be a priority for government and policymakers alike. It is often a reflex of foreign policy scholars to divide the United States and Europe into some sort of false dichotomy between the two, at the Streit Council however there is a push to think of them in a context greater than just shallow cooperation. Indeed, with the clarity of hindsight, I find it somewhat curious that in the courses studied in graduate school I never came across any on Atlanticism. Thus, for any scholar interested in original ways to enhance cooperation amongst the democracies, work at the SC is an enriching experience. It is an old proverb that 'when two elephants fight it is the grass that suffers most;' work at the Streit Council has made me realize how deeply these words resonate in the transatlantic community.



Nueteki is currently a Research Fellow with the Streit Council

By Todd Linton

When I first read about the Streit Council, my initial reaction was that an idea as idealistic and ambitious as the creation of a federal union of the world's advanced democracies must be on the very cutting edge of international relations theory. I assumed that the idea originated with the European Union, and sought to expand the EU by applying its precepts to all democratic states. I was thus pleasantly surprised to learn that the idea of federal union was first proposed in 1939, and was not a product of European integration or NATO, but an antecedent to both. In the short time I have been with the Streit Council, I have learned more about what Clarence Streit's idea means in practical terms, and its relevance to the contemporary world. When transatlantic relations are discussed in the media, I am often dismayed to hear only about divergence and discord, rather than about cooperation and cohesion. While real differences do exist between America and Europe on many issues, I believe the scope of these disagreements is greatly exaggerated, while, unfortunately, the shared values and ideals that tie Europeans and Americans together are overlooked or regarded with indifference. Working at the Streit Council has reaffirmed my belief in the necessity of strengthening transatlantic ties and building up institutions that enhance and promote cooperation among democratic nations. I am especially excited about the prospect of expanding such institutions beyond the traditional transatlantic sphere to include non-Atlantic democracies as well. The challenges that the world faces today may be very different and more diffuse than those that Clarence Streit was responding to with *Union Now*, but his message is no less timely, and the mission of the Streit Council no less vital.



Todd is currently a Research Fellow with the Streit Council

New on the Advisory Board

James Robert Huntley

Jim Huntley, a retired U.S. diplomat, is a native of Washington State. A specialist in world politics and economics, he concentrates on the highly developed industrial democracies of North America, Europe, and East Asia. He was a founder of the Atlantic Institute of International Affairs in Paris and served as a program executive at the Ford Foundation. For ten years he was a Fellow of the Battelle Memorial Institute in Seattle and its chief adviser on international affairs. He was also President of the Atlantic Council of the United States. He is a founder and current vice president of the Council for a Community of Democracies.

His published works include *Europe and America: the Next Ten Years* (1970), *Uniting the Democracies* (1980), and *Pax Democratica* (1998). His latest book, *An Architect of Democracy: Building a Mosaic of Peace*, was published this year. For over 40 years, he has authored numerous articles for US and European publications on these subjects. Mr. Huntley holds a M.A. in International Relations from Harvard University.



Lyubomir Ivanov

Lyubomir Ivanov, a native of Bulgaria, is an expert in foreign policy. Dr. Ivanov is a founding member and Chairman & CEO of the Atlantic Club of Bulgaria. He has been founding President of the Manfred Wornor Foundation since 1994. He was Coordinator of the Marshall Memorial Fellowship Program for Bulgaria of the German Marshall Fund. Formerly a member of the Bulgarian Parliament and Chairman of the Greens Parliamentary Group, he was co-author of the new Bulgarian Constitution and in 1991 Parliamentary Secretary of the Foreign Ministry. From 2001 to 2005, he was an advisor to the Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and since 2002 has been a member of the Presidential Council on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration.

His numerous publications, including two books, cover many diverse subjects, such as foreign policy, mathematics and linguistics. He was educated at the Faculty of Mathematics and Informatics at Sofia University, where he received his Ph.D. in Mathematical Logic and his M.Sc. in Mathematics.



Stanley R. Sloan

Stan Sloan is the founding Director of the Atlantic Community Initiative, a Visiting Scholar at the Rothatyn Center for International Affairs at Middlebury College, and President of VIC-Vermont, a private consulting firm. He was educated at the University of Maine (BA), Columbia University's School of International Affairs (MIA), and American University's School of International Service (PhD). He served as a commissioned officer in the USAF and worked at the CIA, as NATO and European Community desk officer and Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe. He was employed by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress from 1975 to 1999, and retired as the Senior Specialist in International Security Policy. From 1997 to 1998, he was the rapporteur for the North Atlantic Assembly (now NATO Parliamentary Assembly) special presidential report on "NATO in the 21st Century."

Dr. Sloan has lectured widely on Euro-Atlantic security issues at the NATO College in Rome, the Geneva Center for Security Policy, and the Wilton Park (UK) Foreign Office conference center. His most recent book, *NATO, the European Union and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged*, was published in 2005.



Current Research Fellows

From left to right:
Dario Zuddu, SAIS; Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC;
Todd Linton, Indiana University, Bloomington;
Nueteki Akuetteh, New York University, New York.





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