

THE VISION OF AN ATLANTIC FEDERATION

THE FOREIGN POLICY INSTITUTE recommended 18 months ago that the U. S. lead the way toward closer unity among the Atlantic nations. It urged U. S. support for whatever movements toward integration might strengthen the alliance to meet—on the political, economic and military fronts—the two main challenges confronting it: 1) the Sino-Soviet strategy of protracted conflict; and 2) the profound revolution of social systems which is now sweeping the world, both the industrial and the underdeveloped regions.

During the 18 months which have passed since the Institute submitted its report, the two most significant developments have been the preparation of the OECD and the proposals for giving NATO a nuclear capability.

We must admit that, all in all, the fortunes of the Atlantic alliance have not exactly been soaring. Indeed, we could hardly blame the Soviets for thinking that they are now reaping the fruits of many years of diligent efforts to divide, undermine and outflank NATO, while patiently waiting for forces beyond their control to assert themselves within the West—forces which they hope will gradually corrode the alliance.

NATO, unfortunately, does not project an image of a coalition that is sure of itself. Premier Khrushchev has frequently been able to exploit to his own advantage the perennial inclination of Western statesmen to "play a lone hand." The lack of a unified NATO approach has often been painfully manifest in such areas as East-West trade, the nuclear test ban and other arms control negotiations, China policy, the question of decolonization, U.N. diplomacy, and "summitry." NATO members keep on bickering over petty questions of national prestige. Differences of views are inevitable in a free coalition and can even be a source of strength when they are aired frankly in an effort to reach wise and timely decisions. But when they frustrate action indefinitely, they should become an object of concern.

The NATO nations are still incapable of coordinating their policies and speaking with one voice when the Communists

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hurl down their challenge in the Formosa Straits, or Laos, or the Congo, or Algeria (which, incidentally, is defined in the Atlantic Pact as part of the NATO area to be defended against external attack). Not even with regard to the defense of the Continent can agreement be said to prevail. Berlin remains, as it were, a "crisis faucet" which can be turned on and off at will to throw Western strategists into confusion and to render Western leaders more amenable to "accommodation diplomacy" either in Europe or in some other region of conflict. The problem of Berlin is so serious precisely because one false step could lead conceivably to the psychological disintegration of the entire alliance.

Europe—Neither "Shield" Nor "Sword"

The Soviets continue to hold Western Europe under frontal military pressure, certainly not because they fear any attack from Europe, and perhaps not necessarily because they themselves intend to attack Western Europe within the foreseeable future. At present, it seems that the purpose of this pressure is to turn the flank of Europe in Africa. Europe, with fewer than fifteen full-strength divisions as its "shield," cannot defend itself in either a nuclear or a non-nuclear war, much less wield a "sword" in any region outside Europe, even though Africa and other regions are of vital strategic and economic significance.

Unless, within the next two or three years, the U. S. supplies a brand of leadership more vigorous than heretofore and imports to NATO a new sense of positive direction, we might as well prepare ourselves for the eventuality that the present treaty, when it expires in 1969, will not be renewed.

A few detailed remarks on three phases of U. S. policy toward Western Europe are now in order: 1) the OECD; 2) the proposed strengthening of the

deterrent in Europe; 3) the problem of achieving closer political unity.

In its Report, the *Foreign Policy Research Institute* recommended the establishment of machinery for coordination of the economic policies of the North Atlantic countries. We wrote: The U. S. should, in order both to offset the 'third force' tendencies latent in West European integration and to provide a mechanism for protecting the West against the Soviet economic offensive, support the creation of a new Office for Atlantic Economic Cooperation (OAE) as proposed at the Atlantic Congress in London, June 1959. We hoped that such an institution might help to prevent the Six and the Seven from hardening into hostile trading groups, thereby weakening NATO. We suggested that:

the U. S., in cooperation with its European allies, should study ways whereby the latter—with their growing economic capabilities—can bear a larger proportionate share of the burden of providing for the military defense of the NATO region and of contributing to the economic development of the world's underdeveloped areas. The Report dwelt on the importance of trade among the Western industrial states for the growth of the underdeveloped areas, and the need for organizing the various Western aid and trade programs into a single, consistent and more efficient development policy.

A most serious deficiency of the OECD agreement is its complete silence on East-West trade. During the last five years, controls in this field have been weakened to such an extent that the North Atlantic allies themselves are now making a significant contribution to the "strategic economic growth" of the Sino-Soviet bloc. It is quite true that trade warfare cannot bring the communist regimes to their knees. But this is no reason why we should ease the Communists' own planning difficulties or cooperate with them in building up the productivity of the "parallel socialist world market" which will be employed to penetrate, disrupt and dislocate free markets for political purposes. Perhaps the omission in the OECD agreement merely reflects a reluctance on the part of the Western governments to come to grips with a

troublesome issue in a formal document. But, at the very least, there ought to be a tacit understanding that the Economic Policy Committee of the OECD, which has as its task to survey the economic and financial policies of member countries, should maintain a constant review of the strategic and political implications of East-West trade.


We should be on our guard against overestimating the value of the OECD and overselling it to ourselves as an adequate substitute for the Atlantic Community, which it most certainly is not. It fails, for example, to exploit fully those conditions for a genuine "Atlantic Market" which are already in existence. Despite tariff barriers and exchange problems, the transactions of the North Atlantic countries make up the bulk of the world's trade: This is still one of the most important facts in international economics and in global strategy. But to harness fully the enormous productive potential of the Atlantic region, we cannot rest content with establishing OECD. In the final analysis, the economy of the whole NATO area depends critically upon the health, the growth and the competitive muscle of the American economy.

In its Report, the Institute called for a revision of NATO strategy "to meet changes in the global-nuclear balance caused by Soviet nuclear progress." The burden of our argument was that the advent of Soviet missile power had cast into doubt the ability of the U. S. to protect Europe against attack merely by extending its nuclear assurances from afar. Henceforth, in order to make the deterrent more credible in the eyes of both the Soviets and the Europeans, it would be essential to build up a well-balanced military capability for the local defense of Europe.

The Institute therefore recommended: 1) an immediate buildup of NATO's conventional strength; 2) a tactical nuclear force for NATO; and 3) a strategic nuclear force for NATO, capable of retaliating in response to nuclear aggression in Europe. We reasoned that once the gaps in Europe's security had been filled, several desirable results would ensue: 1) the Europeans' sense of security and allegiance to NATO would be enhanced; 2) the threat of a large-scale Soviet attack, based upon the assumption that the U. S. would be paralyzed into inaction, would be removed; 3) the danger that either a small-scale ground probe or an acci-

dental skirmish would immediately escalate into general nuclear war would be greatly diminished because the presence of larger conventional capabilities would enable NATO to contain a local action, thereby forcing a "pause" in which the Soviets would have to consider the full potential consequences of their local pressure; 4) the Europeans' vulnerability to nuclear blackmail when crises arise in other regions of the world would be appreciably reduced; and 5) the European powers would be under less pressure to pour their resources into the creation of independent national deterrents which in the end would probably prove militarily futile anyway.

There is a widespread agreement among Western strategists that the number of NATO divisions in Europe should be increased. It is most unfortunate, however, that no progress has been made toward the goal of 30 ready divisions



called for by the Supreme Allied Command, Europe. This goal, which has long been considered the absolute minimum force adequate for the defense of Europe, was fixed at a time when Europe was still in dire economic straits. Yet, at that time, it was not thought impossible to achieve it. Today, many strategists insist that a much higher number of divisions would be optimum for NATO.*

There is no reason why the NATO countries, with a combined population of 460 million, and a combined GNP more than three times that of the Soviet Union, should not be able to sustain easily a force of 30 divisions. Yet the alliance continues to languish with barely more

*When we speak of a "sword" for NATO, we should not overlook the need for a non-atomic or multi-capable "sword" to deal with future communist threats to the security of key areas in Africa—those political strong-points where indigenous governments will look to the Western powers for guarantees of their independence.

than a dozen full-strength divisions in Western Europe. Before the year is out, decisive steps ought to be taken to remedy this situation. As an earnest of our immediate resolve, one additional U. S. division should be sent to Europe. Furthermore, we should invite our Turkish allies to transfer two of their divisions to the Central front. Both moves would strengthen our position if and when the time comes to bargain for a lessening of tension over Berlin.

The question of creating an additional nuclear deterrent for NATO is admittedly a knottier one. If a genuine NATO nuclear force will be established (as distinct from a redeployment of certain U. S. nuclear weapons and a modification in the consultative arrangements concerning their possible use), then the strategic problem confronting the Soviet Union will be altered drastically. The Soviets will face two first-class nuclear powers instead of one. Virtually all of their strategic calculations, in all quarters of the globe, will be complicated by that fact. Perhaps their propensity for promoting mischief in far away places would subside commensurately.

We would do well to ask ourselves a number of questions about the proposed additional deterrent, not with the expectation of arriving at any dogmatic positions, but simply for the purpose of sharpening our analysis of the problem:

1) If a NATO nuclear force is to be created, is it taken for granted that both the weapons and the control procedures must be distributed across the entire NATO area? Perhaps it is conceivable that all the NATO members could be persuaded to consent to a concentration of the NATO nuclear force, as regards both physical deployment and decision-making, in the area and environs of the Western European Union (i.e., the Six plus Great Britain). This would help to reduce the control problem to more manageable proportions. On the other hand, it would be difficult to avoid charges of favoritism. The Turks, moreover, might fear that the WEU members, at the "moment of truth," would be reluctant to invoke the nuclear deterrent in the event of a Soviet attack upon Turkey alone. Such a fear might or might not be allayed by unilateral assurances of help from the U. S.

2) Should the proposed NATO nuclear deterrent be strategic (in the sense of being usable for massive strikes upon the

territory of the Soviet Union), or should it be tactical (in the sense of being usable at a shorter range, in a more discriminating manner, on the soil of the invaded countries), or should it be a combination of both? Different types of deterrents serve different purposes. A strategic deterrent might help to reduce Europe's vulnerability to nuclear blackmail during periods of international crisis, but it might not enhance the Europeans' sense of security against the possibility of intermediate range ground probes by the Soviets. On the other hand, a moderate number of low-yield, highly mobile, short-range atomic weapons on the soil of certain European countries could strengthen security against invasion, a) Since these weapons do not necessarily cause widespread destruction or excessive contamination, they would constitute a credible deterrent, for their use might be preferable to the loss of independence.

b) They would increase both the cost and risk calculations which the Soviets would have to make prior to an attempted invasion, c) Their very presence in Europe would deprive the Soviets of one of their most awesome advantages—the ability to mass large numbers of men for attack, d) We must remember that the fear of escalation is a two-way street. If the Soviets must fear, just as much as we, that a tactical atomic war will flare into thermonuclear war, then a tactical nuclear force in Europe should serve to render any kind of planned attack in that region less "thinkable." A build-up of conventional forces, however, would still be necessary to contain the dangers of accidents and miscalculations.

It was for such reasons as the foregoing that the Institute proposed in its Report strengthening the NATO deterrent in Europe at three levels: a) strategic nuclear; b) tactical nuclear; and

c) conventional. The closing of all exploitable gaps so that Europe can be adequately defended against any challenge, will make all kinds of war, either conventional or nuclear, less likely to occur in that region.

3) Should the strategic deterrent and the tactical deterrent, if both are created, be placed under the very same set of controls? The answer will depend largely upon the nature of the two forces (assuming for the moment that they can be adequately distinguished from each other)—the size and range of the weapons, their locations, their modes of delivery, the targets at which they would

be aimed, and so forth. Let us suppose that it is possible to draw the line between strategic and tactical forces as suggested above: The U. S. is bound to be more interested in the control mechanism for the strategic force (the one which would strike at Soviet territory) than in that of the tactical force (which would be employed on the soil of Free Europe against invading forces). This is so because a NATO strategic strike at the heart of the Soviet empire is practically certain to evoke a Soviet strategic response against not only Europe but also the continental U. S. But it is less certain that a NATO tactical nuclear strike against a Soviet army far from the borders of Russia would bring intercontinental missiles into action.

"The 15 Fingers on the Trigger"

At least we should strive to establish the presumption that a state can use whatever weapons it wishes *upon its own soil* to repel an invader, and that nuclear defense against aggression is both morally right and strategically feasible. Hence we might envisage two NATO deterrents—a strategic one, in the control of which the U. S. would want to play an important role; and a tactical one, which perhaps ought to be left predominantly in the hands of our European allies under joint command.

4) If there is to be a NATO deterrent, can we stop at giving our allies nuclear weapons, or must we also help them to achieve active and passive defenses of their population and their cities? It is unlikely that any nuclear deterrent can be credible so long as the urban populations of the West are in the position of helpless hostages, exposed to Soviet missiles. I admit that this consideration opens up many complex questions of strategy and economics. But if deterrence and the credibility of deterrence are inseparable from one another, we cannot blink the problem of active and passive defense.

5) How can we square the idea of a unified NATO strategy with national vetoes over the use of nuclear weapons? Some of our European allies would undoubtedly like to exercise both a positive direction and a veto over the use of nuclear weapons in future emergencies. So far as a localized attack upon Europe is concerned, it would probably be wise for the U. S. to respect their wishes in this matter. As suggested above, it might

be feasible to work out arrangements which would leave up to them the choice of weapons to be employed in the defense of their own territory. This is perhaps the best way to resolve the schism in the European soul, alternating between fears that the U. S. will use its nuclear power and fears that it will not. At the present time, however, the U. S. cannot be expected to share with Europe the decision to use nuclear weapons in the case of either a transcontinental surprise attack or a war in a region where the U. S. alone, and not NATO, bears strategic security responsibilities. Were NATO to develop a global strategic doctrine, the problem of sharing the nuclear decision would be resolved. But strategic unity presupposes a much higher degree of political unity than now prevails within the alliance.

6) Finally, if NATO nuclear forces are to be established under joint command, what kind of decision-making processes will have to be devised? The notion of "15 fingers on the trigger" and "15 fingers on the safety lock" is a most unhappy metaphor. In fact, it is nonsensical. It serves only to confuse the issue and to heap ridicule on the concept of a NATO deterrent, or any modification thereof. This metaphor also reflects a long-standing hostility in many quarters to the idea of supranational institutions either in Europe or in the Atlantic Community as a whole. Let us try to achieve clarity in our thinking on this score: If NATO were really a single, free political community, armed with one nuclear force ready to meet any type of aggression, there would be only one finger on the trigger and one on the safety lock. That would be the finger of a joint military command, fully responsible to and controllable by a joint political authority which alone could decide whether the safety lock should be unfastened and the trigger pulled. The crucial decision with regard to any deterrent is the decision to use it. This must be a truly political decision, and the group which makes the decision must be able to operate according to some procedure which is fully agreed upon in advance by all the members. Without advance agreement on the decision-making method, there is no foundation of basic trust; there is no political community; and there is no genuine community deterrent, irrespective of what we call the weapons mechanism which we create. Without

firm prior agreement regarding its use, a nuclear deterrent is always in danger of failing. The Soviets, we must presume, understand this fully. If the deterrent is not "politically operational" in the full sense of the term, it will be vulnerable to the proings of Soviet strategists. Rather than create such a "white elephant" for NATO, we may as well not waste our resources or our trust on such a venture.

We must choose among four alternatives: Do we want an American deterrent which is effectively extended to protect the entire NATO area? Do we want an American *and* a NATO deterrent in the control of which the U. S. has a dominant voice? Do we want an American deterrent and *two* NATO deterrents, one strategic (with the U. S. playing a part) and one tactical (with the Europeans largely exercising control)? Or do we want *one* NATO deterrent, with advance agreement by the NATO countries on the method whereby crucial decisions will be taken?



economic well-being. A similar judgment might be passed upon the whole NATO Community. In the OECD agreement, we express in fact little else but our willingness to cooperate economically so long as the process of cooperation continues to improve our material comfort; but, our reservations make it clear that as soon as we begin to feel an economic pinch, our ardor for cooperation will cool. Meanwhile, there is no certainty or even likelihood that economic cooperation, even if it should prove successful, will by itself lead to closer political unity.

Looking back now, one can say that a turning point was reached in 1954, at a time when the spirit of integration in Western Europe seemed strongest. With the defeat of the European Defense Community, the Six began to move



—cartoon from *Die Welt*, Germany

A crisis of the first magnitude now faces the North Atlantic alliance. The movements toward closer Atlantic unity, and even toward closer West European unity, have slowed down noticeably within recent years.

True enough, within Western Europe itself three significant institutions have thus far been created: the European Coal and Steel Community, the Common Market and Euratom. These, although they are not exactly federal, nevertheless deserve to be called "supranational." Through them, the Europeans have gained invaluable experience in progressing beyond traditional intergovernmental relationships. Although the originators of these experiments in "sector" or "functional" integration looked upon them as way-stations along the road to political unity, it becomes more apparent each year that the integration movement within Western Europe is triggered primarily by the desire for a higher level of

away from the idea of pooling their defense efforts. The advocates of unity sought to recover from that blow by intensifying their offensive along the economic front. The result was the Common Market; but the decision-making procedures incorporated into EEC represented a subtle retreat from the supranational character of the Coal and Steel Community. More recently, hopes of political unification, which had earlier foundered on Britain's Commonwealth ties, have received a further setback from President de Gaulle's criticism of supranational institutions and his insistence upon a much looser grouping of sovereign states, a "Europe of the Fatherlands."

But in the "Europe of the Fatherlands," centrifugal forces are growing apace. The British have many suspicions: that the once bellicose Germans have not changed; that the Common Market is a threat to British prosperity;

that de Gaulle seeks to isolate Great Britain and extend French sway over the Continent. The Germans fear that Britain does not fully accept them as allies and might someday be willing to promote a deal with the Soviets at German expense. Adenauer cannot but wonder whether current French attitudes will weaken both the Six and NATO and launch Germany upon a new path of nationalism and neutralism. The French feel sure that the British would like to torpedo the Common Market; that none of their allies appreciate the strategic importance of their stand in Algeria; and that the U. S. and Britain would be willing to reach an accommodation with the Soviets to prevent them from developing into a nuclear power. In a sense, all of these petty resentments have festered because the U. S. has failed to provide the kind of political leadership of the Atlantic Community which many thoughtful Europeans hoped for when NATO was first formed.

We cannot safely continue with an arrangement under which each of the NATO allies seeks to retain maximum freedom of action or inaction while claiming full support from its partners on any issues which it deems vital. Perhaps, substantial improvements can be made within the alliance through the voluntary coordination of national policies. The real need, however, is for a fundamental structural change in the political relationships within the alliance. The next logical, creative step within the next decade will be the formation of a political framework which will transcend the narrow nationalisms of the last century and a half and carry us into a new, viable regional confederation of free Atlantic nations.

Ultimately, this means striving for an effective common policy through common organs of political decision-making. It ost certainly does not imply an effort to achieve homogeneity of thought among the members of the political community. In fact, it is part of the genius of the pluralist nation-states of the West that their component social groupings can find ways to disagree forthrightly on significant issues. What characterizes democratic communities and holds them together is a basic consensus on political values which permits the members to agree upon rational modes of reaching public policy decisions.

The test of a free political community

is a commitment to abide by some form of majority rule. The members of the society, recognizing a common interest which overrides their differences, demarcate a specified policy zone in which the principle of majority rule will prevail. This they accept not because they deem the majority to be intellectually infallible or morally impeccable. Rather, it is because they realize that if the common good is to be served they must subscribe in advance to the notion of majority rule as a practical device for reaching decisions. The time comes when discussion, however, brilliant, must be closed, when exhortatory efforts to elicit voluntary cooperation must be brought to an end, and when an agreed course of action must be charted.

Throughout Western history, practical minds have been attracted to the idea of majority decision as a common-sense solution to political problems. Governments, of course, find it much harder than do individuals to subscribe to a form of majority decision based upon the assumption of equality. In political practice, they cannot adjust their actions to the legalistic myth of state equality. When governments enter a political community, they must conceive of majority rule in terms of a *qualified* majority acceptable to all, under which the larger members are given a weighted vote. The postwar integration experience of the Europeans demonstrates that this is a practical arrangement.

This is the Grand Design—this vision of an Atlantic confederation or Atlantic federation, call it what you will—which I would like to leave with this Committee. Given a new sense of common purpose within the West, and a pooling of intelligence and resources, there is no foreseeable limit to what we might accomplish in the world. The fate of freedom depends upon the degree to which we and our Atlantic allies are determined to act in concert to defend our common political, cultural and spiritual heritage against an implacable foe, and to advance the well-being of the Free World. Nuclear sharing furnishes an appropriate experiment in building up the kind of confidence and trust among allies which a NATO Confederation would require. Just a few years ago the notion of an Atlantic political community seemed Utopian. But we have now reached the point where we must start thinking about it seriously as a *sine qua non* of our survival as free peoples.