

Herter: "Atlantic Unification Will Have to be Based on Some Form of Federal Principles"
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Christian A. Herter: I wish to associate myself in almost every respect with the testimony presented to the Committee by former Secretary of State Dean Acheson. I think he has done an excellent job of analyzing the seriousness of the eviction notice which has so peremptorily been given to the United States in connection with the stationing of American troops on French soil. I can personally reinforce his own statement that time after time we have inquired of the French government as to what specific changes in the nato structure it would find desirable, with never an affirmative answer of any kind. This makes all the more incomprehensible the argument that unilateral action by France was in any way justified in the light of the commitments assumed by all the members of nato jointly. ... I believe you would want me to testify principally with regard to the economic field in which I have been engaged during the last three and one-half years.

Unity among the North Atlantic nations is obviously the long-range goal which all of us should strive for. ... In its essence it requires a very large measure of agreement in three separate but directly related fields: 1) military security, 2) economic cooperation, 3) political purposes.

This has been clearly recognized by the Congress of the United States. You may recall that in September of 1960, the Congress passed a law creating a Citizens Committee of 20 members to be appointed by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate whose responsibility was to meet with similar groups from the other nato countries to explore ways in which the alliance and the Atlantic Community could be strengthened, particularly in political and economic fields. I was privileged to be named a member of the United States citizens group and Mr. Will Clayton and I were elected Co-chairmen of this group. In Paris, I was elected chairman of the Convention. The opening words of their final declaration read as follows:

"We, the citizen delegates to the Atlantic Convention of nato Nations, meeting in Paris, January 8-20, 1962, are convinced that our survival as free men, and the possibility of progress for all men, demand the creation of a true Atlantic Community within the next decade. . ."

That Convention was not governmental and there has been very little follow-up to the recommendations which it made.

Agreement in the military field is a prerequisite to that degree of physical safety essential to further unification. . . . It is an ironic fact that unity in the economic field as an essential forerunner to unity in the political field was advanced by the inspired efforts of two Frenchmen, Monnet and Schuman, and ably supported by Adenauer in Germany, Spaak in Belgium, and de Gasperi in Italy. . . . The Common Market is based on the Treaty of Rome, which . . . contained strong political implications and bonds having in view a politically united Europe.

Basic to the Treaty of Rome is the progressive reduction of tariff barriers as between the members of the Common Market. These have now moved to a point where only 20 per cent of

the original tariffs still remain. It is now anticipated that these will be fully removed by July of 1957 or 1968.

The European Free Trade Association, or efta, like the Common Market had for its essential purposes the reduction of tariff barriers as between contracting nations. . . . They have followed the Common Market step by step and will have completed a free trade area among themselves within the next year or two. . . . They have reserved to themselves the fixing of separate external tariffs as they see fit, whereas the Common Market is in process of developing common external tariffs.

From the point of view of Atlantic unity, the development of two separate free trade areas in Western Europe with tariff barriers between them is not a healthy development. One real help . . . would be a successful conclusion of . . . the Kennedy Round . . . the multilateral negotiation which has been going on in Geneva for three and one-half years and in which the United States is taking a prominent part by virtue of the Trade Expansion Act. . . . Congress created the position of Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, the position to which I was appointed by President Kennedy, and still hold.



/ wish that I could report to you that the negotiations in the so-called Kennedy Round were going well. They are not. And they are not for much the same reason that the American troops have been told to leave France.

The Common Market is the largest unit engaged in world trade. We are the second largest. It is obvious, therefore, that the success of the Kennedy Round is in large measure dependent on the degree of agreement which can be reached between the Common Market and the United States. This, of course, does not mean that Great Britain, Japan, Canada, etc. are not very important trading nations.

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The principal reason why the negotiations are not going well is the inability of the Common Market to develop a common negotiating position among its six members. France, in particular, has suddenly discovered that her strict adherence to the Treaty of Rome inevitably means giving up a part of her sovereignty and France is apparently determined to

resist the possibility of any coercion insofar as possible. . . . She has, as of today, apparently returned, at least partially, to the fold, but we cannot gauge the extent to which fruitful negotiations can take place and be completed prior to the expiration of the five-year term of our Trade Expansion Act at the end of June, 1967.

I have always felt that the initiative taken by Messrs. Monnet and Schuman in trying to develop a common and liberal economic policy among the European nations was a prerequisite to the kind of political unity which they envisaged. And I feel that if the Kennedy Round fails, further progress toward unity is likely to be replaced by growing protectionist nationalistic postures, with all the dangers that history has taught us would be inherent in such a development. Nevertheless, in spite of serious setbacks, I still have hopes that the next few months will see an improvement in the outlook.

It is sometimes said that the development of a united Europe able "to speak with a single voice" is a prerequisite to progress toward greater Atlantic unity with us. My experience in negotiating with the Common Market Commission . . . has been that its voice is highly uncertain and frequently inaudible, as it has been for the last eight months, while the six try to agree among themselves.

This does not augur well for Europe to achieve in the near future anything approaching an effective single voice even in economic matters, let alone in political or military ones. I believe it would be far better to encourage forward motion on both European and Atlantic fronts at once, in the expectation that progress in one would stimulate progress in the other.

Repeating again that Atlantic unity must be our goal, it is obvious that with the setbacks which are occurring in both the military and economic fields the political outlook is far from good. Again, I associate myself with Dean Acheson in feeling very depressed that the glorious opportunity which presented itself to Europe until recently to build an effective Atlantic Community is being seriously undermined.

That you are holding these hearings, however, is a hopeful sign, and it indicates that you, as Senators, will be exercising your constitutional responsibility of advice and consent in trying to assist in pointing the ways in which the United States might develop a constructive policy at this juncture.

I am a firm believer that the United States must recognize the responsibility of power, and exercise that responsibility. That we have the power is a fact which we cannot deny or escape. In the fostering of the Marshall Plan and the encouraging of Europe toward greater unity, we have utilized this power generously and wisely. Yet there are too many voices in Europe which continually harp on the unhappy dependence of Europe upon the United States as though this were an unmitigated evil and as though we had exercised that power in some untoward way.

Quite recently, I had the opportunity of speaking to a European statesman, who had played a very prominent part in the creation of the new intergovernmental institutions in Europe, and who was closely associated with the Alliance and with the Common Market. I asked him a question point blank ... if he would name the circumstances or the occasions on which we had abused our power, either military, economic, or political, toward any European nation. His answer was most emphatic . He said, "I cannot think of a single instance in which you are to be condemned for anything you have done, but I do condemn you because you have not utilized your power sufficiently. It is still not too late."

In further conversation, it was clear that the power to which he referred was the power of leadership, not of dictation. He had no quick formula or specifics, but he had many suggestions as to areas that we should explore with the European nations. His conclusion was, I think, a wise one. I think we must take the lead, and in doing so follow the lines requisite for a long-range policy as outlined by Professor Bowie in his excellent book, *Shaping the Future*. For those requisites he states: (1) Clarity regarding long-term goals, (2) intermediate programs for practical action which will advance towards those goals and enhance the capacity for future actions, and, (3) steadiness and patience in pursuing those goals and programs.

Merely having patience and expressing hope is not sufficient. Just as I agree with Dean Acheson that we should retain the empty chair in the hope that France will come back wholeheartedly into a nato Alliance and military structure, so I believe, as he does, that we should be acting vigorously toward reconstructing NATO with our other allies and moving ahead on the military course with them which has so far proved remarkably successful.

In the economic field we can press toward the enlargement of the Common Market, a more outward look toward trade restrictions, more effective use of the oecd, in which all members of both the EEC and efta, as well as the United States and Canada, are full participants, and the gradual pooling of the great resources of the Atlantic Community, so as to assist more effectively in the development of the less-developed areas of the world.

In the political field, we should be exploring with the European nations such institutional ties as can best make Atlantic unity a lasting reality.

I am convinced that in the long-run neither military alliances nor customs unions will survive without the cement of political institutions. **This does not mean necessarily the exact type of union which we created here in the United States. It may well be something new based upon the needs of today's world, but it would likewise have to be based on some form of federal principles.**

The ties might well be looser and more flexible as between the different nations. They might well have to grow by degrees rather than by any single blueprint, but they should be part of our objective if we are really trying to achieve Atlantic unity. They should constantly be explored by people who are not too preoccupied by the day to day obligations of action decisions in all parts of the world, but they should be pursued relentlessly, not alone because they are obviously in our own interest, but even more obviously in the interest of the whole free world.

I fear greatly that if the leadership does not come from us, it will not come at all, and that the question will be too frequently asked in the future as to why we did not exercise a leadership which could well retrieve the hopeful beginning made toward Atlantic unity from drifting or being pushed by one nation into hopeless disunity.

The voice of the Senate, and of the Congress as a whole, carries great weight in other countries. Strong reaffirmation by the Legislative Branch of the American people's belief in the goal of effective Atlantic unity, eloquently expressed by President Johnson and each of his predecessors since 1949, would give new hope and encouragement to our friends abroad. It would also give

the Executive Branch new courage to exert active leadership toward that goal. *[All emphasis added by editors.]*